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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN F~~iOTCOURT
IFffilll1i J11o:l!ci8li Dli>irl•:11
0&.ITTl;y of"f'!i'Jin F1::1fts
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VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, )
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal )
Representative of the Estate of
)
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, and )
ROBERT LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and )
TAMARA HALL, natural children
)
of ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, )

<>

State of Jct131hv

OCT 3 0 2007 P/71. l'()/
--.fj'fr:"-----L~@IW,

"'""'""""'. --.._,_

_,

/lii'mill)Yi'.r!!iftV~

Case No.: CV 2005-4345
FINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

)

Plaintiffs
vs.
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
Corporation and
THOMAS BYRNE, P.A.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMBERS OF THE JURY: I will now give you the final jury instructions in this
case. These Final Jury Instructions, along with the Preliminary Jury Instructions which
were given to you earlier in the trial, will control your deliberations. A copy of these
instructions is being provided to each of you for your use during deliberations, and you
may highlight or make notes upon them as you wish. After I have given you these
instructions, counsel for the parties will deliver their closing arguments.

411

Instruction No.

J1-

The instructions are numbered for convenience in referring to specific instmctions.
There may or may not be a gap in the numbering of the instructions. If there is, you
should not concern yourselves about such gap.

412

Instruction No.

IS

During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.

'

4 .i'

,)
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Instruction No.

1.6_

When I say that a party has the burden of proof on the proposition, or use the
expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the
proposition is more probably than not true.

j

Instruction No.

l1_

On the claim of medical negligence against Dr. Clinton Dille, M.D. for failure to
meet the standard of care, the plaintiffs have the burden of proof on each of the
following propositions:
1.

That Dr. Dille failed to meet the applicable standard of care as defined in

these instructions;
2.

That Mrs. Schmechel died;

3.

That the acts of Dr. Dille which failed to meet the applicable standard of

care were a proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel' s death; and
4.

The elements of damage and the amount thereof.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions
has been proven, your verdict should be for the plaintiffs; however, if you find that any
one or more of these propositions has not been proven, then the plaintiffs have not met
the burden of proof required and your verdict should be for Dr. Dille.

Instruction No.

JL

On the claim of medical negligence against Thomas

J. Byrne, P.A. for failure to

meet the standard of care, the plaintiffs have the burden of proof on each of the
following propositions:
1.

That Mr. Byrne failed to meet the applicable standard of care as defined in

these instructions;
2.

That Mrs. Schmechel died;

3.

That the acts of Mr. Byrne which failed to meet the applicable standard of

care were a proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel' s death; and
4.

The elements of damage and the amount thereof.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions
has been proven, your verdict should be for the plaintiffs; however, if you find that any
one or more of these propositions has not been proven, then the plaintiffs have not met
the burden of proof required and your verdict should be for Mr. Byrne.

Instruction No.

Jj_

When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in
natural or probable sequence, produced the damage complained of. It need not be the
only cause. It is sufficent if it is a substantial factor concurring with some other cause
acting at the same time, which in combination with it, causes the damage.
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent
conduct of two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial
factors in bringing about an injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the
injury regardless of the extent to which each contributes to the injury.

' ·1
4 J,

Instruction No.

dD

A cause can be a substantial contributing cause even though the injury, damage
or loss would have occurred anyway without the contributing cause. A substantial
cause need not be the sole factor, or even the primary factor in causing the plaintiff's
injuries, but merely a substantial factor therein.

418

Instruction No.

d- \

To prove that Dr. Dille was "negligent," the plaintiffs must prove, by direct
expert testimony and by a preponderance of all of the competent evidence, that Dr.
Dille failed to meet the standard of health care practice in Twin Falls, Idaho, as such
standard existed from September 26, 2003 through October 2, 2003, with respect to the
class of health care provider to which Dr. Dille belonged and in which he was
functioning; here, a board certified anesthesiologist specializing in pain management.
A doctor such as Dr. Dille, shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained
and qualified doctors in the same community taking into account his training,
experience and field of specialization.

Instruction No.~
To prove that Mr. Byrne was "negligent," the plaintiffs must prove, by direct
expert testimony and by a preponderance of all of the competent evidence, that Mr.
Byrne failed to meet the standard of health care practice in Twin Falls, Idaho, as such
standard existed from September 26, 2003 through October 2, 2003, with respect to the
class of health care provider to which Mr. Byrne belonged and in which he was
functioning; here, a physician assistant.
A physician assistant, such as Mr. Byrne, shall be judged in comparison with
similarly trained and qualified physician assistants in the same community taking into
account his training, experience and field of specialization.

4 z: O

Instruction No.

d-,5,

When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use
ordinary care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary
care" mean the care a reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar
to those shown by the evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do
something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something a
reasonably careful person would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by
the evidence.

4?'
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Instruction No.

dY

A health care provider undertaking the treatment or care of a patient has a duty
to possess and exercise that degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and
exercised by other health care providers who are trained and qualified in the same or a
similar field of care and who practice in the community in which such care was
provided at the time it was provided, in September and October 2003. It is further the
duty of health care providers to use reasonable care and diligence in the exercise of their
skill and the application of their learning.
The defendants Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille are health care providers within the
meaning of this instruction.

422

Instruction No.J-5
You must determine the applicable standard of health care practice required of
the Defendants and any breach thereof only from the testimony of those persons,
including Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne who have testifed as expert witnesses as to such
standard in this case.

Instruction No.

0~

As used in these instructions, the term "community" refers to that geographical

area ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which the
medical care complained of was or allegedly should have been provided.

Instruction No.

d1

Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to
decide. You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance.

425

Instruction N o . ~
You are instructed that the court takes judicial notice of the Idaho Administrative
Procedures Act, § 22.01.03 (2003), entitled "Rules for the Licensure of Physician
Assistants." The rules were in effect in 2003.

426

Instruction No.

d1

By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any
opinion as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled to damages.

Instruction No.

50

If the jury decides the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the Defendants, the

jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate
the Plaintiffs for any damages proved to be proximately caused by Defendants'
negligence.
The elements of damage the jury may consider are:
Economic Damages
1.

The reasonable cost of Rosalie Schmechel' s funeral and headstone.

Non-economic Damages
2.

The reasonable value to each of the Plaintiffs of the loss of the Rosalie

Schmechel' s comfort, love, companionship, affections, guidance, training, services and
society and the present cash value of any such loss that is reasonably certain to occur in
the future, taking into consideration the life expectancy of the plaintiffs, the decedent's
age and life expectancy, habits, disposition and any other circumstances shown by the
evidence.

428

Instruction No.

5/

You are instructed that if you find the Plaintiffs are entitled to damages that you
may award only such damages as have been proven by the Plaintiffs with reasonable
certainty.

Instruction N o . ~
When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that may accrue in
the future, I mean that sum of money determined and paid now which, when invested
at a reasonable rate of interest, would be sufficient to pay the future damages at the
time and in the amount the future damages will be incurred.

430

Instruction No.

~

Under a standard table of mortality, the life expectancy of a female age 60 is 23.21
years. Rosalie Schmechl was 60 years of age at the time of her death. This figure is not
conclusive. It is an actuarial estimate of the average probable remaining length of life
based upon statistical samples of death rates and ages at death in this country. This
data may be considered in connection with all other evidence relating to the probable
life expectancy, including the subject's occupation, health, habits, and other activities.

Instruction No.

2S Y

Your award, if any, for plaintiffs' injuries will not be subject to any income taxes,
and you should not consider such taxes in fixing the amount of your award.

Instruction No.

A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the
damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise
such care cannot be recovered.

4 ',v '•.I.)

Instruction No.

:S 6

In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or

decide any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If
money damages are to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may
not agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the
method of determining the amount of the damage award or percentage of negligence.

4 .,_;, .4'

Instruction N o . ~
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least
three-fourths of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of
each juror agreeing to it.

It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a
view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual
judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an
impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your
deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if
convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight
or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere
purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges of the facts. Your sole interest is
to ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.

,, r::
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Instruction No.

'3J

On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will
preside over your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions.
Follow the directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of
you by the instructions on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As
soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in
the verdict, you should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary
that the same nine agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman
alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so
agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the
bailiff, who will then return you into open court.
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Instruction N o . ~
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you
may send a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to
communicate with me by any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands
on any of the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so
byme.

4 'l,., "I'

Instruction No.

Y0

In this case, you will return a Special Verdict consisting of a series of questions.
In answering a question, you must be persuaded, considering all of the evidence in this
case, that your choice of answer is more probably true than not true. Because the
explanation on the form which you will have is part of my instructions to you, I will
read the verdict form to you and explain it. It states:

We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatory as follows:

Question No. 1: Did defendant Clinton Dille, M.D., negligently fail to meet the
applicable standard of health care practice in this community in his care and treatment
of Rosalie Schmechel?

Answer to Question No. 1:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, then do not answer Question No. 2 and

proceed directly to Question No. 3.
If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1, then answer Question No. 2.

Question No. 2: Was Dr. Dille's breach of the standard of care a proximate cause
of Mrs. Schmechel's death?

Answer to Question No. 2:
Please answer Question No. 3.

Yes[_]

No[_]

Question No. 3:

Did defendant Thomas

J. Byrne, P.A. negligently fail to meet

the applicable standard of health care practice in this community in his care and
treatment of Mrs. Schmechel?
Answer to Question No. 3:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If your answers to Questions No. 1 and 3 were "No" you are finished. Please
sign the verdict form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. If you answered "Yes" to
Question No. 3, then answer Question No. 4.
Question No. 4: Was Mr. Byrne's breach of the standard of care a proximate

cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death?
Answer to Question No. 4:

Yes[_]

No[_]

If you answered Questions Nos. 2 and 4, "No," you are finished. Please sign the
Special Verdict Form and tell the bailiff that you are finished.

If you answered

Questions Nos. 2 and/or 4, "Yes," then continue to Question No. 5.
Instruction for Question No. 5: You have reached this Question if you have

found that either defendants Dr. Dille and/or Mr. Byrne breached the standard of care
applicable to them and that breach of the standard of care proximately cause damage to
the plaintiffs. In this Question, you are to apportion the fault between the parties on a
percentage basis. As to each defendant that you found to have proximately caused
damages to plaintiffs in answering Questions Nos. 2 and/or 4 "Yes," please determine
the percentage of fault of that party and enter the percentage on the appropriate line
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below. If you answered "No" to any of the above Questions, write a "O" or "Zero" as to
that person. Your total percentages must equal 100 percent.
Question No. 5: What percentage of fault (if any) do you assign to each of the

following individuals:
Answer to Question No. 5:

To the Defendant, Clinton Dille, M.D.

_ _%

To the Defendant, Thomas J. Byrne, P.A.

_ _%

TOTAL (must equal 100%)
Please answer Question 6.
Question No. 6: What is the total amount of damages plaintiffs sustained as a

result of defendants' negligence?
Answer to Question No. 6: We assess the plaintiffs' damages as follows:

1.

Vaughn Schmechel's economic damages, as defined in Instruction No. 30:
$. _ _ _ _ _ __

Vaughn Schmechel' s non-economic damages, as defined in Instruction
No.30:
Household services:
$_ _ _ _ _ _

Services in the form of contribution to the family business:
$_ _ _ _ _ _

Other non-economic damages:
$_ _ _ _ _ _ _

2.

Robert Lewis' non-economic damages, as defined in Instruction No. 30:
$_ _ _ _ _ _ _

3.

Kim Howard's non-economic damages, as defined in Instruction No. 30:
$ _ _ _ _ _ __

4.

Tamara Hall's non-economic damages, as defined in Instruction No. 30:
$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

TOTAL DAMAGES

DATED This _

$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

day of October 2007.

FOREPERSON

Instruction N o . ~
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you
regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the
facts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then
you will retire to the jury room for your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore,
the attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important.
At the outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic
expression of opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one
does that at the beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be
reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you
are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no
triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only
after a discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually,
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, and
ROBERT P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD
and TAMARA HALL natural children
of ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased,

Case No. CV-05-4345
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

Plain tiffs,
VS.

CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A.
and JOHN DOE, I through X,
Defendants.

We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatory as follows:

Question No. 1: Did defendant Clinton Dille, M.D., negligently fail to meet the
applicable standard of health care practice in this community in his care and treatment of
Rosalie Schmechel?
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - I

Answer to Question No. 1:

Yes[_]

No

[j(J

If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, then do not answer Question No. 2 and
proceed directly to Question No. 3.

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1, then answer Question No. 2.
Question No. 2: Was Dr. Dille's breach of the standard of care a proximate cause of

Mrs. Schmechel's death?
Answer to Question No. 2:

Yes[_]

No[_]

Please answer Question No. 3.
Question No. 3: Did defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. negligently fail to meet the

applicable standard of health care practice in this community in his care and treatment of
Mrs. Schmechel?
Answer to Question No. 3:

Yes[_]

If your answers to Questions No. 1 and 3 were "No" you are finished. Please sign
the verdict form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. If you answered "Yes" to
Question No. 3, then answer Question No. 4.
Question No. 4: Was Mr. Byrne's breach of the standard of care a proximate cause

of Mrs. Schmechel' s death?
Answer to Question No. 4:

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM · 2

Yes[_]

No[_]
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If you answered Questions Nos. 2 and 4, "No," you are finished. Please sign the
Special Verdict Form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. If you answered Questions
Nos. 2 and/or 4, "Yes," then continue to Question No. 5.
Instruction for Question No. 5: You have reached this Question if you have found

that either defendants Dr. Dille and/or Mr. Byrne breached the standard of care applicable
to them and that breach of the standard of care proximately cause damage to the plaintiffs.
In this Question, you are to apportion the fault between the parties on a percentage basis.
As to each defendant that you found to have proximately caused damages to plaintiffs in
answering Questions Nos. 2 and/or 4 "Yes," please determine the percentage of fault of that
party and enter the percentage on the appropriate line below. If you answered "No" to any
of the above Questions, write a "O" or "Zero" as to that person. Your total percentages
must equal 100 percent.
Question No. 5: What percentage of fault (if any) do you assign to each of the

following individuals:
Answer to Question No. 5:

To the Defendant, Clinton Dille, M.D.

_ _%

To the Defendant, Thomas J. Byrne, P.A.

_ _%

TOTAL (must equal 100%)
Please answer Question 6.
Question No. 6: What is the total amount of damages plaintiffs sustained as a

result of defendants' negligence?
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 3

Answer to Question No. 6: We assess the plaintiffs' damages as follows:
1.

Vaughn Schmechel's economic damages, as defined in Instruction No. 30:
$_ _ _ _ _ __

Vaughn Schmechel's non-economic damages, as defined in Instruction
No.30:
Household services:
$_ _ _ _ _ _ _

Services in the form of contribution to the family business:
$_ _ _ _ _ _ _

Other non-economic damages:
$_ _ _ _ _ __

2.

Robert Lewis' non-economic damages, as defined in Instruction No. 30:
$ _ _ _ _ _ __

3.

Kim Howard's non-economic damages, as defined in Instruction No. 30:
$ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

4.

Tamara Hall's non-economic damages, as defined in Instruction No. 30:
$- - - - - - - - ·

TOTAL DAMAGES

DATED This )Oday of October 2007.
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 4

$ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

·~11!2_,t/t__
FOREPERSON

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 5
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDI~I:~S-T~~~;~c::~;·;::
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually,
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P.
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

Case No. CV-05-4345

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and
JOHN DOE, I through X,
Defendants.

The above captioned case was tried to a jury from October 16 through October 30, 2007.
Based on the verdict entered on October 30, 2007, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and
DECREED that defendant Thomas J. Byrne. P.A., is awarded judgment against plaintiffs, together
with costs as allowed by law upon timely submission of a cost bill.
DATED this £ctay ofNovember, 2007.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of November, 2007, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:
David Comstock
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500
P.O. Box 2774
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorney for Plaint/Ifs
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721
Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY
601 W. Bannock ST.
PO Box2720
Boise ID 83701-2720
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, MD. and
Southern Idaho Pain Institute
Fax No.: (208)388-1300
Keely E. Duke
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701

L---4J.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
__ Overnight Mail
__ Telecopy

L------0.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
__ Overnight Mail
__ Telecopy

~ - Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
__ Overnight Mail
__ Telecopy

~.·~
Clerk of the Court

JUDGMENT-2

·

419

,..,,
,:- i""

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FfFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, Individually, and
as
Surviving
Spouse
and
Personal
. of the Estate of ROSALIE
Representative
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P.
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL, natmal children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

:
:
:'
:
;
:
:

Case No. CV 05 4345

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
Vs.
'
CLINTON DILLE,
M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X,

Defendants.

':
:
;
:
''
''
'
'
'

This matter having been tried before a jury on October 16-30, 2007 and the jury having
rendered its verdict in the Defendants' favor on October 30, 2007;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all claims against
Defendants Clinton, Dille, M.D. and the Southern Idaho Pain Institute are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE and JUDGMENT IS AWARDED in favor of Defendants Clinton, Dille, M.D. and
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the Southern Idaho Pain Institute and against the Plaintiffs, together with such costs as allowed
by law upon timely submission of a cost bill.
DATED this

1_ day of November, 2007.

District Judge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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day of November 2007, I caused to be served a true and
I hereby certify that on this
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

David E. Comstock
COMSTOCK & BUSH
199 N. Capitol Blvd. #500
P.O. Box 2774
Boise, ID 83701-2774
Byron Foster
COMSTOCK & BUSH
199 N. Capitol Blvd. #500
P.O. Box 2774
Boise, ID 83701-2774
Richard E. Hall
Keely E. Duke
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton PA
702 W. Idaho Street
P.O. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701-1271

Steven J. Hippler
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720

_ l..-u:s. Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
Fax

~.S.Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
Fax
~S.Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
Fax

/2s.Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
Fax

452
JUDGMENT-3

ORIGINAL
David E. Comstock, ISB #: 2455
Taylor L. Mossman ISB #: 7500
LAW OFFICES OF COMSTOCK & BUSH
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500
P.O. Box 2774
Boise, Idaho 83701-2774
Telephone: (208) 344-7700
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721
Byron V. Foster, ISB #: 2760
Attorney At Law
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500
P.O. Box 1584
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-4440
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually,
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased,
and ROBERT P LEWIS, KIM HOWARD
and TAMARA HALL, natural children of
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
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PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL- P. 1

Case No. CV-05-4345

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL

COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through her attorneys of record, Comstock and
Bush and Byron V. Foster, Attorney at Law, and moves this Court, pursuant to Rufe
59(a)(1 ),(3) and (7) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for an order granting a new
trial.

This Motion is made based upon the files and pleadings in this case, the

proceedings at trial and before trial, and the Memorandum and Affidavit filed herewith.

·n-

DATED THIS

f

S

day of November, 2007.

~~.
Taylor M
man,
Attorney o Plaintiff
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, David E.
Comstock and Byron V. Foster, and respectfully submit this Memorandum in support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial.

I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This matter was tried before the Court and Jury commencing on October 16,
2007, and concluding on October 30, 2007. The Jury rendered its Verdict pursuant to a
Special Verdict on October 30, 2007. The Jury found no negligence and found in favor
of the Defendants. Judgment was entered for Defendant Byrne on November 5, 2007.
Judgment was entered for Defendants Dille and Southern Idaho Pain Institute on
November 9, 2007.
II.

ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial is based upon a four-part argument that
encompasses both pretrial proceedings and proceedings during trial. The first aspect of
Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial concerns the Court's refusal to allow the Plaintiffs'
experts to offer opinion testimony regarding the Delegation of Services Agreement and
how it pertains to the standard of care. The second aspect concerns the Court's ruling
denying the Plaintiffs' motion to preclude Dr. Smith from testifying. Third, the Plaintiffs
assert that the Court's ruling excluding the IDAPA regulations from the Jury's review
was in error. The final aspect of the Plaintiffs' argument concerns the Court's decision
to bifurcate "reckless" out of the jury instructions.

MEMORANDUM IN SU PORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 2

1.

THE DELEGATION OF SERVICES AGREEMENT

Plaintiff's first ground for meriting a new trial is based primarily on the prejudice
that Plaintiffs suffered during the course of discovery prior to trial.

The Plaintiffs

requested in their Notice of Taking Video Deposition Duces Tecum of Defendant Byrne,
filed on May 1, 2006, that the Defendants bring a copy of the Delegation of Services
Agreement to the deposition.

When the Plaintiffs took the deposition of Defendant

Byrne on May 18, 2006, the Defendants provided Plaintiffs a copy of a 2001 contract
setting forth Defendant Byrne's initial employment contract and a 2004 Delegation of
Services Agreement. At the deposition, counsel for Defendant Dille told the Plaintiffs on
the record that in 2003, a Delegation of Services Agreement was not required under the
IDAPA regulations. See, Amended Notice of Taking Video Deposition Duces Tecum of
Thomas Byrne, with the relevant excerpt of the deposition, attached as Exhibit A to

Affidavit of Byron Foster {"Foster Aff.").
However, upon further review of the matter, Plaintiffs counsel learned that the
IDAPA regulations did require a Delegation of Services Agreement in 2003, and also
required that a physician overseeing a physician assistant is to keep a copy of the
Delegation of Services Agreement on the premises for inspection by the Board of
Medicine at any time. After discovering this requirement, the Plaintiffs requested that
the Defendants produce the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement on June 29, 2006.
See, Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to
Defendant Thomas Byrne, attached as Exhibit B to Foster Aff.

The Defendants'

response was that such an agreement did not exist. See, Defendant Thomas Byrne's
Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for Production of Documents, attached as
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 3
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Exhibit C to Foster Aff.

The Plaintiffs then wrote a letter to the Defendants, again

requesting that the Defendants supplement their discovery and provide a copy of the
Delegation of Services Agreement.

See, Letter to Counsel for the Defendants

Regarding the Delegation of Services Agreement, attached as Exhibit D to Foster Aff.

Less than one week before the trial, on October 11, 2007, the Defendants provided a
copy of the Delegation of Services Agreement. See, Letter from Defendant to Plaintiffs'
counsel dated October 11, 2007 Regarding Exhibit 276, the Delegation of Services
Agreement, attached as Exhibit E to Foster Aff. The same day, the Plaintiffs requested

to see a copy of the original Delegation of Services Agreement because the copy the
Plaintiffs received was appeared to have a 2007 date written on it. See, Email from
Plaintiffs paralegal to Counsel for the Defendant Regarding the Delegation of Services
Agreement, attached as Exhibit E to Foster Affidavit.

As explained below, Plaintiffs

were severely prejudiced by this late disclosure.
At trial, the Plaintiffs intended to have several experts offer opinions that the
Delegation of Services Agreement, in part, set forth the standard of care because it
outlines the parameters of a physician assistant's duties. If the Plaintiffs were enabled
to show that the Defendants failed to follow the Delegation of Services Agreement, then
the Plaintiffs could have also demonstrated to the jury that the Defendants failed to
follow the standard of care imposed on them by law. The Court ruled that because the
Plaintiffs' disclosures did not speak to this issue, the Plaintiffs had foreclosed their
opportunity to make such an argument. Idaho Code§ 6-1012 specifically requires that
in medical malpractice cases, plaintiffs must prove their case with direct expert
testimony.

In excluding the testimony of Plaintiffs' experts, the Court precluded the

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 4
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Plaintiffs from meeting the requirements of § 6-1012.

The Court made this ruling

despite Plaintiffs' arguments that the Plaintiffs received the Delegation of Services
Agreement, the document that would have enabled the Plaintiffs to timely disclose what
they anticipated their experts to testify to,

on the eve of trial. Further prejudice ensued

at trial when the Defendants were permitted to assert that the Delegation of Services
Agreement was not the standard of care and that because Defendant Byrne and Dr.
Dille had a history of working together and the plain language of the Delegation of
Services Agreement could basically be ignored.
The Defendants further commented that the Delegation of Services Agreement
does not define the standard of care in their closing argument. This comment came
after no expert at trial had opined that the Delegation of Services Agreement set forth
the standard of care. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that it is inappropriate for a
party to comment on evidence that misrepresents or mischaracterizes the evidence.

State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 (1993).

The Court

specifically ruled that experts could not testify that the Delegation of Services
Agreement set forth the standard of care for a physician assistant. Accordingly, the
Defendants took advantage of their late disclosure to the Plaintiffs' prejudice. Had the
Defendants timely disclosed the Delegation of Services Agreement to the Plaintiffs, the
Plaintiffs would have had an opportunity to address whether the Delegation of Services
Agreement provided a basis for the standard of care imposed on the Defendants long
before trial ever began.
In addition, the Defendants stated that a Delegation of Services Agreement was
not required by law in 2003, when in fact it was. At the deposition of Defendant Byrne,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL· 5
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counsel for Defendant Dille specifically stated, "with regard to the Delegation of
Services Agreement, this was not in effect in 2003, as the Board of Medicine did not
require them until 2004."

Mr. Byrne then testified, "I think there was a-some

documentation that was with the Board of Medicine, but not necessarily a Delegation of
Services Agreement."

The Plaintiffs, in part relying on this representation, did not

pursue the Delegation of Services Agreement as a possible source for the standard of
care.

Due to the Defendants statements that an Agreement did not exist, the late

disclosure of the Agreement, the Court's subsequent ruling that the Plaintiffs' experts
could not testify that the Agreement provides a standard of care, and the statements by
Defendants' counsel that no expert testified during trial that the Delegation of Services
Agreement sets forth the standard of care, the Plaintiffs were precluded from developing
the theory of their case and prejudiced by the Defendants' statements concerning the
Delegation of Services Agreement.

Whether this constitutes an irregularity in the

proceedings of the trial pursuant to IRCP 59(a)(1 ), an unfair surprise pursuant to
59(a)(3) or an error in law pursuant to IRCP 59(a)7; the result is the same, the Plaintiffs
were prejudiced by the late disclosure and such prejudice amounts to a basis for
Plaintiffs to have the opportunity to address this issue before the Court, and ultimately a
jury.

2.

DR. SMITH'S TESTIMONY SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED

Plaintiffs next move the Court, pursuant to IRCP 59(a) (1 ),(3) and/or (7) for a new
trial based upon the Plaintiffs' belief that the Court erroneously allowed the testimony of
Dr. Smith. In the Defendants' original disclosures pertaining to Dr. Smith, Dr. Smith had
no opinion regarding Mrs. Schmechel's cause of death on a "more likely than not" basis.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL· 6

See, Defendant Byrne's Disclosure of Expert Witnesses, attached as Exhibit F to Foster
Aff.

In the Defendants' initial disclosures, Dr. Smith opined that other factors may have

contributed to Mrs. Schmechel's death, but he did not state what the causes could have
been.

Because Dr. Smith did not seem to have an opinion, on a more likely than not

basis, the Plaintiffs did not depose him. The Plaintiffs did so under the assumption that
the Court would not allow an expert to testify unless the expert's opinion met the "more
likely than not" standard.

Again, shortly

before trial, the Defendants provided the

Plaintiffs with a supplemental expert disclosure that revealed Dr. Smith did actually have
an opinion regarding Mrs. Schmechel's cause of death. Similar to the Delegation of
Services Agreement, the Defendants disclosed Dr. Smith's opinion regarding Mrs.
Schmechel's cause of death at the eleventh hour before trial unfairly surprising the
Plaintiffs. See, Defendants' Supplemental Expert Disclosures, attached as Exhibit G to
Foster Aff. The week before trial the Defendants revealed that Dr. Smith would testify,
on a more likely than not basis that the cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death was cardiac
arrest.
Due to the late disclosure, the Plaintiffs were unable to research and seek out an
expert in cardiology that would provide testimony to counter that of Dr. Smith's. The
purpose of Rule 26(e)(1 )(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is to prevent this type
of prejudice and ensure that each party is entitled to a fair trial. That rule states,
"(a) party is under a duty seasonably to supplement the response with
respect to any question directly addressed to ... the identity of each person
expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on
which the person is expected to testify, and the substance of the person's
testimony."
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I.R.C.P. 26(e)(1 )(B). While the Idaho Supreme Court has not defined what a
"seasonable" disclosure is, the Court has given a good indication of what is not
seasonable, and has expressed a strong policy disfavoring the same tactics of
late disclosure employed by the Defendants in this case. The Court recently held
that late disclosure regarding the opinions of defense experts in medical
malpractice cases should not be accepted:
"We do not look favorably upon discretionary decisions by district judges
that encourage last-minute witness disclosure and unreasonably prevent
plaintiffs from responding, particularly in complex medical malpractice
cases where experts will be furnishing the jury with the bulk of the
necessary, and often technical, facts."
Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873 136 P.3d 338, 344 (2006).

In the instant

matter, the Court correctly determined that allowing Dr. Smith's testimony was within
the Court's discretion.

However, Plaintiffs were "stonewalled" by the Defendants 11

days before trial when the Defendants finally disclosed Dr. Smith's opinion that Mrs.
Schmechel's cause of death was cardiac arrest.

See, Id.

The Plaintiffs were not

afforded an opportunity to depose Dr. Smith on this late opinion regarding the cause of
death, the Plaintiffs did not have a full opportunity to prepare for cross-examination of
Dr. Smith as to his newly expressed opinions, and the Plaintiffs did not have an
opportunity to undertake additional discovery of their own to counter Dr. Smith's opinion.
The Plaintiffs were in essence blindsided by Dr. Smith's opinions, as they altered the
entire dynamics of the case. Accordingly, the supplementation of Dr. Smith's opinion
was not seasonable, and his testimony should have been excluded at trial.
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3.

THE COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATLEY INSTRUCT THE JURY
AND/OR ADMIT THE IDAPA REGULATIONS

It is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury on the law. Woodburn v. Manco,
137 Idaho 502,509 50 P.3d 997, 1004 (2002). The IDAPA regulations are the law that
specifically pertains to the level of care imposed, by law, on physician assistants. This
case involves the asserted violation of those regulations. Seemingly then, a jury sitting
in the State of Idaho should be able to consider the standard of care the Idaho
legislature authorized the Idaho State Board of Medicine to promulgate regarding
physician assistants in Idaho.

The Court did not instruct the jury on the IDAPA

regulations, and in doing so, the Plaintiffs contend, ·committed error.
Not only do the IDAPA regulations require that a physician must keep a copy of
the Delegation of Services Agreement that the physician maintains with his or her
physician assistant

on the premises in which the physician practices, but the IDAPA

regulations set forth specific requirements for physician assistants. They are in fact, the
"Rules For the Licensure of Physician Assistants." IDAPA § 22.01 .03.000 (2003).

On

cross examination, Mr. Byrne even admitted that the IDAPA regulations are the law that
governs the duties of a physician assistant.

Mr. Byrne further conceded that the

regulations require a Delegation of Services Agreement to be in place, and that if Mr.
Byrne, as a physician assistant, does not practice within the bounds of that agreement,
then he practices below the standard of care that is imposed on him by law.
While the Court permitted the Plaintiffs to use the IDAPA regulations to cross
examine Mr. Byrne, the Court reserved ruling on their admissibility. At the conclusion of
trial, when the parties and the Court addressed jury instructions, the Court gave its
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL· 9

ruling that it would not admit the IDAPA regulations for the jury's review.

Plaintiffs

respectfully contend this was in error. In Sanchez v. Galey, the Idaho Supreme Court
recognized that statutes and administrative regulations may define the applicable
standard of care owed. Sanchez
(1986).

v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 617 733 P.2d 1234, 1242

In the present matter, the IDAPA regulations clearly set forth the required

standard of conduct for physician assistants, as they were designed to "govern the
activities of persons employed as physician assistants by persons licensed to practice
medicine and surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery in Idaho." IDAPA
22.01 .03.000 (2003).

In fact, § 22.01 .03.030.03 of the IDAPA regulations is titled

"Practice Standards" and explicitly states:
"A physician assistant shall not write prescriptions ... diagnose and manage
major illnesses or conditions or manage the health care of unstable or
acutely ill or injured patients unless those conditions are minor ... "
§ 22.01 .03.028 of the IDAPA regulations also defines and limits the "Scope of Practice"
for a physician assistant in Idaho. That section provides that a physician assistant may
"manage the health care of the stable chronically ill patient in accordance with the
medical regimen initiated by the supervising physician." The IDAPA regulations do not
permit the physician assistant to initiate his or her own medical regimen for the patient.
Accordingly, the IDAPA regulations clearly define what the standard of care for
physician assistants in Idaho is in the "Practice Standards" and "Scope of Practice"
sections of the regulations.
As the court recognized in Sanchez, the legislature has a particular intent in
enacting certain statutes that give the Board of Medicine the authority to adopt
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regulations. The legislature has done so in Idaho Code § 54-1806(2) to ensure that
patients are protected from the unauthorized or negligent care of physician assistants.
The Court's holding in Sanchez reflects that the intent of the legislature in enacting
certain statutes, such as § 54-1806(2), is to assure patient safety, and Courts are in the
best position to ensure that the legislature's intent is upheld by allowing instructions
regarding statutory or regulation violations.

It is the Plaintiffs' contention that a jury

would find, had they had the opportunity to review the IDAPA regulations and discern
the appropriate standard of care for a physician assistant, that Mr. Byrne was in
violation of the regulations and corresponding standard of care.
obligation to ensure that the jury is instructed on the law.

It is the Court's

When the Court precluded

the jury from considering the IDAPA regulations, it deprived the Plaintiffs of their
entitlement to have the jury so instructed.

Additionally, by delineating the IDAPA

regulations from the instructions to the jury, the Court failed to adequately instruct the
jury on the law.

4.

"RECKLESS" SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN BIFURCATED IN THE
JURY INSTRUCTIONS.

As the Court is aware, the Plaintiffs submitted two trial briefs regarding the
definition of "reckless" and how the jury should be instructed with respect to the
Defendants' alleged recklessness. The Court accepted the Plaintiffs' definition of
"reckless." However, the Court made the determination to bifurcate the instructions so
that the jury would not be instructed on whether the Defendants' conduct was reckless
unless the jury first determined that the Plaintiffs were entitled to damages exceeding
the statutory cap for damages.
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When considered as a whole, the jury instructions must fairly and adequately
present the issues of the case and state the applicable law." Perry v. Magic Valley
Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 995 P.2d 816 (2000).

Reversible error occurs

if an instruction misleads the jury or prejudices a party. Id. Citing, Lawton

v. City of

Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 462, 886 P.2d 330, 338 (1994). Plaintiffs contend the Court's

decision to bifurcate the instructions prejudiced them at trial.
The complications that stem from the Court's determination to bifurcate the
reckless instruction are two-fold. First, the Court allowed Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Arthur
Lipman, to testify that in his opinion, Defendant Byrne's course of treatment for Mrs.
Schmechel was reckless.

The Plaintiffs focused much their questioning of Dr. Lipman

to his determination that Mr. Byrne was reckless in his treatment of Mrs. Schmechel.
Thus, unknowing of what the Court's ultimate instruction to the jury would be regarding
the Defendants' recklessness, the Plaintiffs elicited substantial testimony to the jury
regarding the Defendants' recklessness.

Such testimony, without a corresponding

instruction likely confused or misled the jury.
The second complication arose because the jury was not given the option before
rendering a verdict that the Defendants' conduct was such a severe departure from the
standard of care that it could have constituted reckless behavior. Recklessness is a
characterization of the degree of departure from the standard of care, and the Plaintiffs
presented significant evidence that the Defendants' breach of the standard of care
constituted recklessness. In preventing the Plaintiffs from arguing recklessness in the
closing argument and in precluding the jury from even considering whether the
Defendants' conduct was reckless, the Court in effect, severed the Plaintiffs' case and

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL • 12

467

prevented the jury from making their own determination on whether the Defendants'
conduct was reckless. In medical malpractice cases, there is no requirement that the
trier of fact must first find that a Defendant is negligent before they can find that the
Defendant was reckless. It is entirely possible for the trier of fact to find that that a
Defendant was reckless without ever reaching the question of whether the Defendant
was negligent. t is also important to recognize the issue from the juror's perspective. A
juror listening to the testimony in this case heard evidence that the Defendants' conduct
was reckless.

Upon retiring for deliberations, without a corresponding reckless

instruction, all of that testimony becomes meaningless. Not only is the juror prevented
from considering why the reckless testimony may have been important, but the jury will
second guess the testimony, and discount the credibility of the witness and the
Plaintiffs' overall case, because it has no bearing on their ultimate determination.
Accordingly, the Court's ruling on bifurcating the reckless instruction, which
effectively prevented the jury from even considering whether the Defendants' conduct
was reckless constituted an irregularity in the proceedings of trial, or in the alternative,
an error in law unfairly prejudicing the Plaintiffs.

I.R.C.P. 59(a) (1) and (7). Such

irregularity and/or error affected a substantial right of the Plaintiffs and mandates a new
trial pursuant to IRCP 59(a)7. See, Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co. Ltd., 127 Idaho
565, 575, 903 P.2d 730, 740 (1995).
IV.
CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs seek a new trial pursuant to IRCP 59(a)(1 ), (3) and (7) because of
irregularities, surprises, prejudices, and errors in law that were made to the Plaintiffs'

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 13

458

detriment.

The Plaintiffs have suffered prejudice from the Defendants' failure to

disclose and late disclosure of evidence that was material to the case, such as the
Delegation of Services Agreement and Dr. Smith's opinion regarding Mrs. Schmechel's
cause of death. The Plaintiffs also contend that the jury was not properly instructed on
the law when the Court did not incorporate the IDAPA regulations into the instructions.
In addition, the Plaintiffs were prejudiced by the Court's decision to bifurcate the
issue of recklessness from the closing arguments and from the jury instructions. While
understanding that is difficult to formulate a set of instructions for the jury that coincides
with the evidence presented at trial until after all the evidence has been presented, the
Plaintiffs contend that the Court's decision to separate the reckless instruction after the
trial concluded prejudiced the Plaintiffs during their case presentation. Bifurcating the
reckless instruction out until or if the jury's verdict exceeded the statutory cap had the
effect of unfairly dissecting the Plaintiffs' case during the jury's deliberations.
Plaintiffs are mindful that the evidentiary and procedural determinations the Court
rendered before and during trial were intricate and demanding, to say the least.
However, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that they are entitled to a fair trial, free from
prejudice and irregularities that affected the outcome of this trial.

In that light, the

Plaintiffs move this Court for a new trial to ensure that substantial justice is done.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ) V / ~ f November, 2007.
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Steven J. Hippler
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601 W. Bannock St.
PO Box2720
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D
l2f
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
E-Mail

Richard E. Hall
Keely E. Duke
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BLANTON, PA
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
PO Box 1271
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D
D

U.S. Mail
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Facsimile (208) 395-8585
E-Mail
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Attorneys for Defendants, Clinton Dille, M.D.
and Southern Idaho Pain Institute

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, Individually, and:
as Surviving Spouse and Personal :
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE :
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT :
P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA :
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE :
SCHMECHEL, deceased,
'
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV 05 4345

DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE,
M.O. AND SOUTHERN IOAHO PAIN ·
INSTITUTE'$ RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL

Vs.

.

''
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN :
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho :
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and:'
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X, :
'

Defendants.

Defendants Clinton Dille and the Southern Idaho Pain Institute respond to and
oppose Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION

This matter was tried to a Twin Falls county jury from October 16, 2007 through
October 30, 2007. After considering the evidence and law, the jury returned a verdict in
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M.0. AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'S RESPONSE TO
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the Defendants' favor finding they did not breach the applicable standard of care.
Plaintiffs now ask the Court to overturn the jury's verdict and grant them a new trial on
several grounds. While Plaintiffs assert at least four separate issues justifying a new
trial, all of Plaintiffs' arguments arise out of discretionary rulings the Court made during
the course of the trial. The Court properly recognized these issues as issues requiring
exercise of its discretion and through an exercise of reason, properly ruled on the issues
at trial.

Although Plaintiffs now complain about several of the Court's discretionary

rulings, they have failed to establish the Court abused its discretion in making those
rulings.

Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion should be denied and the jury's verdict should

stand.
II. ARGUMENT

· A.

Plaintiffs Cannot Meet the Legal Standard that Would Justify Granting a
New Trial.·
The trial court is vested with wide discretion in granting or denying a motion for a

new trial and a trial court's decision will not be overturned unless the trial court
"manifestly abused the wide discretion vested in it." Jones v. Panhandle Distributors,
Inc., 117 Idaho 750, 755, 792 P.2d 315, 320 (1990) quoting Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho

759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986).
Plaintiffs seek a new trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)
subparts (1 ), (3), and (7). To succeed on their motion, Rule 59(a)(1) requires Plaintiffs
to establish an "irregularity in the proceeding of the court." I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1 ). In turn,
Rule 59(a)(3) requires Plaintiffs to establish an "accident or surprise, which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against." I.R.C.P. 59(a)(3).

Finally, Rule 59(a)(7)
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requires Plaintiffs to establish an "error of law, occurring at trial."

I.R.C.P 59(a)(7).

Plaintiffs cannot meet any of these standards.
The Court has wide discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for new
trial and a trial court's decision will not be overturned unless the trial court manifestly
abused its discretion. Craig Johnson Const., LLC v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142
Idaho 797, 800, 134 P.3d 648, 651 (2006). fdaho appellate courts review the decision
to grant or deny a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. Warren
v. Sharp, 139 Idaho 599, 603, 83 P.3d 773, 777 (2003). On appeal the trial court's

decision to grant or deny a new trial will not be disturbed absent a showing of manifest
abuse. Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526,529, 81 P.3d 1236, 1239 (2003).
When considering whether to grant a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1 ),
. plaintiffs must establish that an. irregularity in the proceedings of the Court, jury or
adverse party prevented plaintiffs from receiving a fair trial. A Court's determination of

whether such an irregularity prevented plaintiff from having a fair trial is a matter of
discretion. Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc., 114 Idaho 432, 440, 757
P.2d 695, 703 (Ct. App.,1988)
A motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(3) requires a showing that the alleged
accident or surprise is one that "ordinary prudence could not have guarded against."
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(3). Hughes v. State, Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement, 129 Idaho 558,
562, 929 P.2d 120, 124 (1996).

Further, the moving party must establish that such

accident or surprise caused prejudice. See Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918,
821 P.2d 973 (1991).
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Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7), the trial court may grant a new trial for errors in law
that occurred during trial, but only if such error affects a substantial right of the moving
party. Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 345, 986 P.2d 996, 1011
(1999). The trial court is vested with "wide discretion" to deny a motion for new trial
pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7) when the substantial rights of the movant are not affected and
that party is riot entitled to a new trial as a matter of right. Craig Johnson Const., LLC,
142 Idaho at 801, 134 P .3d at 652.

B.

If the Ultimate Care Defendants' Provided to Mrs. Schmechel Complied
With the Standard of Care, Plaintiffs Arguments Focusing on Collateral
Issues Must Be Rejected.
At the heart of this case is the jury's finding that the Defendants were not

negligent in their care and treatmentof Mrs. Schmechel. Plaintiffs' arguments focusing
on the IDAPAs, 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement and reckless jury instruction
are red herrings. If the actual medical treatment provided to Mrs. Schmechel compliecl
with the standard of care, the substance of the IDAPAs, 2003 Delegation of Services
Agreement and whether or not a reckless jury instruction was issued are of little, if any,
relevance.
Through their arguments on collateral issues, Plaintiffs attempt to draw the
Court's attention away from the fact that they failed to prove their prima facia medical
negligence case to the jury. The fact remains that after listening to weeks of testimony
from both lay witnesses and experts and reviewing numerous exhibits, the jury was
convinced the Defendants' care of Mrs. Schmechel was reasonable. Even assuming for
the sake of argument the IDAPAs or 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement may have
been violated (which Defendants vigorously continue to deny), if Mr. Byrne ultimately
provided adequate care, then the Defendants could not be found liable for any violation
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of these standards because the actual medical treatment was still reasonable and
because these alleged peripheral IDAPA and Delegation of Services Agreement
breaches did not proximately cause any injury. Ultimately, the arguments regarding the
Delegation of Services Agreement and the IDAPAs are equivalent to an-argument over
who should be steering a ship, the captain or the first mate, which ignores the jury's
conclusion that regardless of who was steering the ship, it was steered in a reasonable,
non-negligent manner.
It is against this backdrop that Plaintiffs arguments must be considered. Plaintiffs
are dissatisfied with the jury's verdict, but they fail to offer any satisfactory reason to
disturb the jury's ultimate conclusion that the Defendants' care and treatment of Mrs.
Schmechel did not violate the standard of care.
C.

The Court Properly Excluded Expert Testimony Relating to the 2003
Delegation of Services Agreement.
Plaintiffs complain they were improperly precluded from eliciting expert testimony

in an attempt to establish the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement set forth Mr.
Byrne's standard of care. The Court made clear, however, that Plaintiffs could call a
rebuttal expert on this topic (as well as the IDAPAs), but Plaintiffs chose not to do so.
Plaintiffs also make much of the fact the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement was
inadvertently produced late in the litigation due to the fact it was not discovered in Mr.
Byrne's files until after the discovery d.eadfine had technically passed. 1
Plaintiffs fail to mention, however, that Mr. Byrne had produced the 2004
Delegation of Services Agreement as well as Mr. Byrne's job description, which

1

All parties worked diligently to assure full exchange of information up to the eve of trial. In fact, Plaintiffs
were supplementing their document production as late as September 14, 2007 and producing documents
at that time that had been requested as early as April 17, 2006.
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contained nearly the exact same language concerning Mr. Byrne's scope of practice as
the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement. (See Trial Exhibits 40 and 233; Hippler
Aff. at Exhibit B). Even though both of these documents were available to Plaintiffs
since early 2006, the Plaintiffs did not disclose, at any time before trial, that their experts
held any opinions that Mr. Byrne had acted beyond the scope of his practice in seeing
Mrs. Schmechel and modifying her pain care regimen without first consulting Dr. Dille
based upon Idaho law or Mr. Byrne's job description. Indeed, a review of Plaintiffs'
experts, Dr. Lipman, Dr. Lordon and Mr. Keller's, depositions and the documents
Plaintiffs provided them prior to the depositions demonstrates these experts were never
provided Mr. Byrne's job description, the 2004 Delegation of Services Agreement and
never reviewed the IDAPAs.

Notwithstanding this fact, they opined, both at their

depositions and at trial, that Mr.. Byrne. did ·not violate Idaho law in prescribing
medication to Mrs. Schmechel and modifying her pain care regimen. (See Hippler Aff. at
Ex. C, (Deposition of Dr. Lipman) p. 191, II. 8-16 and p. 237, II. 3-6, Ex. D (Deposition of
Mr. Keller) p. 55, L. 19- p. 56, L. 3, Ex. E (Trial Testimony of Mr. Keller) p. 51, II. 15-22,
and Ex. F (Trial Testimony of Dr. Lordon) p. 66, I. 8- p. 67, I. 6).
Plaintiffs also assert they relied upon representations by Dr. Dille's and the
Southern Idaho Pain lnstitute's counsel at Mr. Byrne's deposition that a Delegation of
Services Agreement was not required by law in 2003. 2 Plaintiffs were not entitled to rely
upon legal interpretations set forth in an objection by opposing counsel at a deposition
and were instead obligated to do their own research on this issue.

Once Plaintiffs

2

In 2003 the Board of Medicine only required that there be on site a written agreement outlining the
understanding of the relationship between the PA and supervising physician. See IDAPA § 22.01 .03.04
(2003), Based upon the information known at the time of Mr. Byrne's deposition, it was believed his 2001
job description fulfilled this requirement. (See Hippler Aff. at~ 3).
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researched the issue by reviewing the applicable IDAPAs for themselves, which they
should have reasonably done before Mr. Byrne's deposition, they specifically requested
a 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement from Defendants. After further research of
Mr. Byrne's files, a 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement was found and immediately
produced to Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs were free to research the IDAPAs at any time and

specifically request a 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement prior to Mr. Byrne's
deposition or even serve a request for admission confirming one did not exist. They
chose not to do so and only researched the IDAPAs in the days immediately prior to
trial. This is not Defendants' fault and is certainly not grounds to grant a new trial.
Indeed, Plaintiffs came to Mr. Byrne's deposition with the 2006 IDAPAs and tried to
question Mr. Byrne on this version of the IDAPAs. Dr; Dille's counsel properly objected
to. the foundation of the questions and noted that the regulations from which Plaintiffs
were asking questions were not in effect in 2003. The particular portions of IDAPA
regulations the Plaintiffs attempted to use at the 2006 deposition had an effective date
of 2004. (Hippler Aff. at ,r 4 and Ex. A, p. 95, II. 5-22). Plaintiffs should have researched
the regulations and been prepared at the deposition to question Mr. Byrne on the
regulations in effect in 2003.
This Court noted the similarity in the language in the job description and
Delegation of Services Agreements in sustaining the Defendants' objection to Plaintiffs'
questioning of Dr. Lordon concerning the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement.
(Hippler Aff. at Ex. F (Trial Testimony of Dr. Lordon) at p. 39, LL. 14 -L. 21) Therefore,
the Plaintiffs were fully aware of the "the nature of the inquiry and the circumstances
sur~ounding" the language contained in 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement and
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should have supplemented their expert disclosures if they intended to pursue this theory
at trial. (Id.). Indeed, Plaintiffs did not even supplement their expert disclosures in the
days before trial to indicate their experts held such opinions.
Moreover, the Court allowed Plaintiffs to cross examine both Mr. Byrne and Dr.
Dille at trial with the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement.

Plaintiffs elicited

testimony from both Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille relating to the purpose and scope of the
2003 Delegation of Services Agreement and displayed portions of the Agreement to the
jury. (Hippler Aff. at Ex. G (October 19, 2007 Trial Testimony of Mr. Byrne) p. 8, I. 19- p.
9, I. 9, and Ex. I (Trial Testimony of Dr. Dille) p. 58, I. 6-p. 62, I. 15). Plaintiffs were free
to, and did in fact, question both Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille regarding whether or not the
2003 Delegation of Services Agreement established the standard of care for Mr. Byrne's
practice at the Southern Idaho Pain lnstitute. 3
Likewise, Plaintiffs were also free to, and in fact did, argue in closing that the
2003 Delegation of Services Agreement established Mr. Byrne's standard of care and
that he breached it.
closing remarks.

Defendants then properly responded to this argument in their
Defendants did not, as Plaintiffs assert, "misrepresent or

mischaracterize the evidence." 4 (Memorandum in Support at 5). Plaintiffs' reliance on

State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 864 P.2d 596 (1993) is misplaced.

In

Raudebaugh, a criminal case, the Idaho Supreme Court actually failed to reach the
issue of whether a prosecutor's comments describing the manner of a murder victim's
3

It is also important to note that despite being unaware that Plaintiffs were going to put the scope of Mr.
Byrne's authority under the Delegation of Services Agreement and the IDAPAs at issue during the trial,
Defendants were also not allowed to have their experts testify regarding the IDAPAs or the Delegation of
Services Agreement in response to Plaintiffs' questioning of Defendants with these documents, based
upon Plaintiffs' disclosure objection, which the Court sustained.
4
Plaintiffs did no! object to Defendants' closing arguments, however, and therefore waived any objection
they had to any argument made during closing arguments. Therefore, even if the objection is valid, it is
deemed to have been waived. Quick v. Crane. 111 Idaho 759. 782, 727 P.2d 1167, 121 O ( 1986)].
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death that may have actually been inconsistent with the evidence adduced at trial was
fundamental error. Raudebaugh had no bearing on this case at all.

D.

The Court Properly Excluded the IDAPAs from Evidence and Properly
Instructed the Jury Concerning the IDAPAs.
In a related argument, the Plaintiffs assert they were prejudiced by the Court's

refusal to admit the Idaho IDAPAs relating to Physician Assistants into evidence so the
jury could review them while deliberating. The Court allowed Plaintiffs to freely cross
examine the Defendants with the IDAPAs and allowed Plaintiffs to display them to the
jury and offer argument relating to the IDAPAs, however.
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs' contentio.n that "[t]he Court did not instruct the jury
on the IDAPA regulations" is unfounded and a simple review of the final jury instructions
refutes this argument. In Instruction No. 28, the Court instructed the jury:
You are instructed that the court takes judicial notice of the Idaho
Administrative Procedures Act, § 22.01,03 (2003), entitled "Rules for the
Licensure of Physician Assistants." The rules were in effect in 2003.
Plaintiffs proposed an instruction that commented on the facts of this particular case,
which the Court properly rejected in favor of a general instruction regarding the IDAPA's
· existence and their legal effect.

In giving this instruction, moreover, the Court

specifically licensed Plaintiffs to freely show the jury the IDAPAs and argue their
interpretation of these regulations.

Plaintiffs chose not to do so in their closing

argument; this was their own tactical choice.
Further, the Court gave Plaintiffs great latitude in using the IDAPAs to cross
examine both Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille and in displaying them to the jury. (Hippler Aff. at
Ex. H (October 24, 2007 Trial Testimony of Mr. Byrne) p. 100, I. 25 - p. 106, I. 12 and
Ex. I (Trial Testimony of Dr. Dille) p. 25, I. 25 - p. 62, I. 15). The Plaintiffs had ample
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opportunity to present their IDAPA theory to the jury through effective cross-examination
and argument.
Just because the actual IDAPAs themselves did not go back with the jury does
not mean the Plaintiffs were prejudiced in any way. Rather, the Court was justifiably
concerned that the IDAPAs would confuse and/or mislead the jury. The IDAPA's actual
meaning was hotly debated by counsel throughout trial and sending a complex set of
legal regulations back to the jury would only serve to confuse them and invite them to
interpret the law for themselves rather than following the Court's instructions on the law.
Moreover, Plaintiffs did not prove the necessary elements to establish a violation
of the IDAPAs in question and, in turn, to establish any negligence per se. 5 Plaintiffs
cite Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1242 (1986) to support their contention
that statutes and administrative regulations may be used to define the applicable
standard of care. Sanchez and many later cases including Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho
393,395, 34 P.3d 1076, 1078 (2001) make clear, however, several elements must be
met before a statute or regulations can be used to establish the standard of care and
trigger the doctrine of negligence per se.
Negligence per se occurs where a person violates an ordinance or state law.
Ahles, 136 Idaho at 395, 34 P.3d at1078.

A claim of negligence per se requires a

plaintiff to prove: (1) the statute or regulation clearly defines the standard of conduct; (2)
the statute or regulation was intended to prevent the harm caused by defendant's act or
omission; (3) plaintiff is a person of the class the statute or regulation was designed to
protect; and (4) the violation must be a proximate cause of plaintiff's alleged injury.
5

It is further unclear whether the doctrine of negligence per se is applicable in a medical negligence case
based upon professional malpractice and the requirements of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 that
require plaintiffs to prove through their case through the direct expert testimony and opinion.
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O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 52, 122 P.3d 308,311 (2005).

Negligence

per se is a question of law for the court. Ahles, 136 Idaho at 395, 34 P.3d at1078.

Negligence per se is no different from ordinary negligence. Id. Neglig~nce per se only
acts to remove duty and breach from the jury. Id. (citing Slade v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp.,
119 Idaho 482,489,808 P.2d 401,408 (1991)).
In Ahles v. Tabor, the district court held that the defendant was negligent per se
for violating I.C. § 49-633 for passing the plaintiff's vehicle on the right side and causing
a subsequent collision. Ahles, 136 Idaho at 394, 34 P.3d at 1077. On appeal, the
Idaho Supreme Court addressed each of the four requirements of negligence per se
and determined the statute did not allow for application of the doctrine of negligence per
.. se .. .The Ahles court found that elements 2 and 3 were met as the statute was intended

, to protect motorists and plaintiff felt within the protected category. However, the court
held. "the standard of conduct described in I.C. § 49-633, . . . is far from clear and
· requires statutory interpretation including consideration of problematic definitions of
terms used in the statute." Id. 136 Idaho at 396, 34 P.3d at 1079.
The Ahles court further held there were numerous questions as to certain terms
in the statute that were subject to interpretation, and that "[a]II of these questions add to
the complexity of the statute and show that the standard of conduct derived from
interpreting the statute is less than clear and not easily ascertained or applied." Id. As
such, the Ahles court held that J.C. § 49-633 did not satisfy the test with regard to the
"description of a clear standard of conduct. Accordingly, the alleged violation of the
statute in this case cannot be deemed negligence per se." Id.
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Here, IDAPA sections 22.01 .03 et seq. are far from clear and fail to define many
key terms. Specifically, IDAPA section 22.01 .03.28 SCOPE OF PRACTICE, indicates
various items which a physician assistant may perform if included in the Delegation of
Services Agreement including, "Diagnose and manage minor illnesses or conditions"
and "manage the health care of the stable chronically ill patient in accordance with the
medical regimen initiated by the supervising physician." IDAPA §§ 22.01.03.28.03 and
22.01 .03.28.04.
The IDAPAs do not define "minor illnesses or conditions" or "major illnesses or
conditions" or what constitutes "chronically ill." The IDAPAs do not define the term
"manage." As such, what constitutes a minor or major illness or condition is ambiguous
and left to interpretation.

In addition what constitutes managed care of a stable

chronically ill patient is left to interpretation. If Mrs. Schmechel's chronic pain was a
·. minor condition (as testified to by Mr. Byrne) the IDAPA Regulations would allow Mr.
Byrne to diagnose and manage such condition.
As stated above, the fourth requirement to find that violation of a statute or
regulation equates to negligence per se is that "the violation must have been the
proximate cause of the injury." Ahles, 136 Idaho at 395, 34 P.3d at 1078. Plaintiffs did
not meet this requirement as Dr. Dille testified at trial, that with regard to Mr. Byrne's
treatment of Mrs. Schmechel, he would not have done anything differently. (Hippler Aff.
at Ex. I (Trial Testimony of Dr. Dille) p. 75, I. 25- p. 76, I. 11). Because Dr. Dille would
not have changed the treatment provided by Mr. Byrne to Mrs. Schmechel, plaintiffs did
not establish that any alleged breach of the IDAPAs or Delegation of Services
Agreement was the proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death.

Furthermore, as
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discussed in Section A, above, to find a breach of the standard of care, the Plaintiffs
had to prove the medical care provided was unreasonable or negligent.

Here, by

answering question No. 1 and question No. 3 -of the special verdict form "No," the jury
necessarily concluded that it was reasonable for Mrs. Schmechel to be prescribed
Methadone the way that it was prescribed and the medical treatment was not
unreasonable.
In this case, the !DAPAs in question are subject to interpretation and do not
clearly define a required standard of conduct.

Further, because testimony at trial

indicated Dr. Dille would not have changed Mr. Byrne's care and treatment of Mrs.
Schmechel, Plaintiffs did not establish any alleged breach of the IDAPAs was the
proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death. Moreover, the Plaintiffs did not prove that
the medical care provided, regardless of who provided it, was negligent.
Therefore, Plaintiffs did not establish the IDAPAs clearly defined a required
standard of conduct for Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille, nor did Plaintiffs establish that any
alleged violation of the IDAPAs was the proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death.
As such, Plaintiffs did not meet the necessary requirements to establish negligence per
se and the Court properly declined to instruct the jury with specific language from the
IDAPAs or admit the IDAPAs into evidence for the jury to review during their
deliberations.
The Plaintiffs suffered no prejudice through the Court's refusal to admit the
IDAPAs and send them back to the jury. As the Fifth Circuit noted in Alexander v.
Conveyors & Dumpers, Inc, when a party is allowed to read a safety code to the jury

and question witnesses with the document the complaining party does not suffer any
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prejudice.

Alexander v. Conveyors & Dumpers, Inc., 731 F.2d 1221, 1229 (5th Cir.

Miss. 1984) ("Secondly, no substantial right of Alexander's was affected by the failure to
admit the Code as an exhibit because the relevant sections had already been read and
shown to the jury.")
Finally, as discussed above, if the ultimate care Mr. Byrne rendered to Mrs.
Schmechel was not negligent, than any alleged violation of the IDAPAs is moot because
any alleged violation of the IDAPA did not result in Mrs. Schmechel receiving
substandard medical care.

The heart of this case is the care and treatment Mrs.

Schmechel received, which the jury unanimously found was not negligent as is reflected
by the juror's unanimous verdict answering questions No. 1 and No. 3 of the special
verdict form "No."

E.

The Court Properly Admitted Dr; Smith's Testimony.
Plaintiffs assert Dr. Smith's opinion concerning Mrs. Schmechel's cause of death

was not sufficiently disclosed prior to trial and that they were somehow prejudiced by ·
the Dr. Smith's testimony. Dr. Smith's did not fully develop his cause of death opinion
until he reviewed the deposition of Shaiyenne Anton, the deputy coroner who
investigated the scene of Mrs. Schmechel's death and concluded Mrs. Schmechel died
while she was awake. Based in large part upon Ms. Anton's determination who was
charged with determining the manner of death, Dr. Smith was able to conclude a
sudden cardiac event, such as a cardiac arrhythmia, likely caused Mrs. Schmechef's
death. See Trial Testimony of Dr. Smith. Due to the number of depositions that were
required in this case and Ms. Anton's schedule, her deposition, unfortunately, was not
taken until September 5, 2007. The parties tried diligently to schedule depositions in
this matter, but due to various scheduling difficulties, some depositions, including Ms.
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Anton's, were not scheduled until the eve of trial. (See Affidavit and briefing of Mr.
Byrne's Counsel). Dr. Smith then reviewed the deposition and his expert disclosure
was supplemented on October 4, 2007 as soon as feasible after Dr. Smith
communicated his revised opinion to Defendants' counsel. 6
Contrary to Plaintiffs' insinuation, Defendants were not attempting to "sand bag"
or "stonewall" them with a late expert disclosure.

Rather, Defendants were simply

complying with their discovery obligations and supplementing their expert disclosures as
soon as they learned Dr. Smith had slightly expanded his earlier disclosed opinion
regarding cause of death. This was not malicious. Instead, it was in compliance with
Rules, and Defendants had plenty of time to depose him if they wished and Plaintiffs did
prepare an effective cross examine of Dr. Smith concerning his cause of death opinions.
If Plaintiffs had wished to depose Dr. Smith prior to trial, Defendants would have
accommodated this request.

Instead, Plaintiffs chose not to depose any· of the

Defendants experts.
Plaintiffs cite Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006) for the
proposition that a trial court should not exercise its discretion in a manner that
prejudices one party or the other.

Plaintiffs ignore, however, a later passage in

Edmunds, which is directly on point here. In Edmunds, the Idaho Supreme Court noted:

Second, Idaho law specifically contemplates that expert testimony can
change after the initial disclosure. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
26(e)(1)(B) requires that litigants supplement discovery responses as to
"the identity of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at
trial, the subject matter on which the person is expected to testify, and the
substance of the person's testimony." This Court has held that_ this rule
"unambiguously imposes a continuing duty to supplement responses to
6

All parties provided supplemental expert disclosures up to the eve of trial. Plaintiffs provided
supplemental briefing regarding expert opinions on October 15, 2007. Plaintiffs last supplemental expert
disclosure was on October 5, 2007.
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discovery with respect to the substance and subject matter of an expert's
testimony where the initial responses have been rejected, modified,
expanded upon or otherwise altered in some manner." Clark v. Klein, 137
Idaho 154, 157, 45 P.3d 810, 813 (2002) (quoting Radmer v. Ford Motor
Co., 120 Idaho 86, 813 P.2d 897 (1991)) (emphasis added). In fact,
litigants are subject to sanctions, including the exclusion of expert
testimony, when they have failed to supplement an expert's opinion. See,
e.g., Radmer, 120 Idaho at 91,813 P.2d at 902.
Edmunds, 142 Idaho 867,874, 136 P.3d 338,345 (2006) (emphasis in original).
In other words, had Defendants not supplemented Dr. Smith's expert disclosure,
which put Plaintiffs on notice of his revised opinions, it is possible the Court might have
precluded him from opining regarding Mrs. Schmechel's cause of death. 7 Instead, in
compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants supplemented Dr. Smith's
disclosure prior to trial and the Court properly allowed Dr. Smith to testify regarding Mrs.
Schmechel's cause of death.

It is not the Defendants' fault Ms. Anton's deposition

could not be arranged until·· late in the process due· in large part to the Plaintiffs'
counsel's schedule and the joint cooperation that all counsel afforded each other in this
case.
Finally, Dr. Smith's cause of death opinion only related to the issue of proximate
cause-an issue the jury did not reach. The jury instead found the Defendants did not
breach the standard of care. Therefore, allowing Dr. Smith's opinion concerning cause
of death was, at the most, harmless error that did not affect the jury's ultimate verdict or
prejudice the Plaintiffs in any way.

7

Just as the Court properly excluded Dr. Lordon's undisclosed opinion concerning the application of the
2003 Delegation of Services Agreement (See Section II. A, above).
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F.

The Court Properly Bifurcated the Issue of Recklessness from the Jury's
Initial Determination of Liability and Damages.
The instructions to the jury must be read as a whole and any review of the

instructions "is limited to a determination of whether the instructions. as a whole, fairly
and adequately present the issues and state the law." Garcia v. Windley, 164 P.3d 819,
822 -823 (2007). Plaintiffs offer two arguments relating to the Court's bifurcation of the
issue of recklessness from the jury's consideration of liability and damages. Plaintiffs
first argue that the jury may have been confused because they questioned their expert,
Dr. Lipman, concerning his opinion of whether or not Mr. Byrne acting recklessly in his
treatment of Mrs. Schmechel.
Plaintiffs were free, of course, to question their expert on any disclosed topic they
wished relating to the subject matter of the lawsuit. The fact Plaintiffs choice to focus
some of their questions on the issue of recklessness was entirely their decision. By that
point in the trial, Defendants had expressed their opposition to instructing the jury on
recklessness, and Plaintiffs bore the risk of confusing the jury with their questioning if
the Court decided not to instruct the jury on recklessness. Just because the Plaintiffs
proposed a recklessness instruction did not mean the Court would ultimately instruct the
jury on that issue. The Court properly weighed the evidence submitted and the law and
determined the issue of recklessness only became relevant if liability was found and
damages awarded in excess of the statutory non-economic damages cap.
Second, Plaintiffs appear to argue the jury could have found Mr. Byrne reckless
"without ever reaching the question of whether the Defendant was negligent."
(Memorandum in Support at p. 13). This argument defies common sense as well as the
state of the law. The face of Plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction even makes it clear
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"reckless" conduct is conduct bearing a higher degree of culpability than negligent
conduct. Plaintiffs' proposed instruction on recklessness stated:
The words "reckless conduct" when used in these instructions and when
appiied to the allegations in this case, mean more than ordinary
negligence. The words mean acts or omissions under circumstances
where the actor knew or should have known that the acts or omissions not
only created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, but involved a high
degree of probability that such harm would actually result.
(Emphasis added).
Under Plaintiffs' own definition of recklessness, if Mr. Byrne was not negligent, he could
not be reckless. Many Idaho cases recognize the distinction between "negligence" and
"recklessness."

See e.g. Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365, 128 P.3d 897,

902 (2005); Galloway v. Walker 140 Idaho 672, 676, 99 P.3d 625, 629 (Ct. App. 2004).
Even Black's Law Dictionary recognizes the fact recklessness embraces a higher
standard than negligence and states in its definition of recklessness that, "Recklessness
involves a greater degree of fault than negligence but a lesser degree of fault than
intentional wrongdoing." Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed. (West 1999).
Plaintiffs argument makes even less sense when considered in light of Idaho
Code sections 6-1012 and 6-1013, which govern medical malpractice claims. These
sections require plaintiffs "[i]n any case, claim or action for damages due to injury to or
death of any person ... on account of the provision of or failure to provide health care
or on account of any matter incidental or related thereto" to prove through direct expert
testimony that the defendant "negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of
health care practice of the community in which such care allegedly was or should have
been provided ... " (Emphasis added). Under these sections, therefore, Plaintiffs had to
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prove negligence to recover for medical malpractice, and their argument that a finding of
.recklessness without negligence could have been sufficient must be rejected.
Plaintiffs sought to instruct the jury on recklessness so they had a basis to pierce
the statutory non-economic damages cap of Idaho Code§ 6-1603 if the jury found the
Defendants negligent and returned a damage award above the cap. The issue of the
statutory non-economic damage cap was only relevant if the jury awards non-economic
damages in excess of the cap. In fact, the statute specifically provides the jury should
not be informed of the cap during its deliberations. See I.C. § 6-1603(3) "(If a case is
tried to a jury, the jury shall not be informed of the limitation contained in subsection (1)
of this section.").
Finally, instructing the jury on recklessness and allowing Plaintiffs counsel to
argue Mr. Byrne was reckless would have greatly prejudiced the Defendants,
particularly when the issue of recklessness only applied to Mr. Byrne, if it applied in this
case at all.

There was no allegation or expert opinion offered that Dr. Dille or the

Southern Idaho Pain Institute were reckless. Inserting inflammatory language, such as
is contained in the reckless jury instruction, would have been particularly prejudicial to
Dr. Dille and the Southern Idaho Pain Institute. The jury could easily have confused the
parties to whom the recklessness standard applied and improperly applied the
instructions.
Therefore, the Court properly exercised its discretion in declining to instruct the
jury on recklessness until the jury found liability and damages in excess of the statutory
non-economic damages cap.

Ill. CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants Dr. Dille and the Southern Idaho Pain
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Institute respectfully submit the Plaintiffs have failed to bear their burden and have not
established that they are entitled to a new trial under Rule 59 and its subparts.
Therefore, Defendants request the Court deny the Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial and
allow the jury's verdict to stand.

DATED this 3rd day of December 2007.
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP

N,~U~

ILL VARIN
Atta nays for Defendants
· ton Dille, M.D. and Southern
Idaho Pain Institute
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, David E.
Comstock and Byron V. Foster, and. respectfufly submit this Reply Memorandum in

support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New Triar.

!.
tllifil!MENT
The Defendants assert that the IDAPA regulations, the Delegation of Services
Agreement and !he "reckless" jury instruction are all "red herrings" with respect to the

Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial because the jury found no negligence. However, what

the Defendants' argument fails to recognize is that a!! of the alleged "red herrings" form
the standard of care upon which the jury based Its determination of whether the
Defendants' conduct was negligent Because these "red herrings" were not properly
addressed at trial, the jury was placed in the position of considering this case under an
improper standard of care.
1.

THE LATE DISCLOSURE OF THE DELEGATION OF SERVICES

AGREEMENT PREJUDICED THE PLAINTIFFS
The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs did not suffer prejudice from the

Defendants' late disclosure of the Delegation of Services Agreement for Mr. Byrne
because the Defendants supplied the Plaintiffs with the 2004 Delegation of Services

Agreement and the 2001 job Description early in the discovery process, which
contained nearly the same language as the 2003 Agreement that the Defendants finally
disclosed on the eve of trial. However, the Defendants' argument is empty. Plaintiffs
could not have relied on the 2004 Delegation of Services Agreement or the 2001 Job
Description to form the theory of their case or produce experts, including rebuttal
~

4j
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experts. The 2004 Delegation of Services Agreement and 2004 Job Description have
no significance to this case because the events that led to Mrs. Schmechel's death and
the Defendants' relevant conduct occurred in 2003.

The Defendants further contend that the Plaintiffs are at fault for failing to
research whether a Delegation of Services Agreement was required in 2003 by the
IDAPA regulations untl! days before the trial. However, as set forth in the Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Support of

a New Trial, the Plaintiffs requested that the Defendants

produce the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement on June 29, 2006. See, Plaintiffs'
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Defendant
Thomas Byrne, attached as Exhibit "B" to the Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Support of

Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial ("Foster Aff."), filed on November 19, 2007.

The

Defendants' response was that the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement did not
exist. See, Defendant Thomas Byrne's Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests

for Production of Documents, attached as Exhibit "C" to Foster Aff.
More notably, however, it was not the Plaintiffs' burden to research whether the
Delegation of Services Agreement was required by the IDAPA regulations in 2003 once
the Plaintiffs requested its production. As Defendants in this case, they had an
obligation to research whether a Deiegation of Services Agreement existed once the
Plaintiffs requested one and then provide it to the Plaintiffs. Such is the Defendants'
burden during discovery.

When the Defendants state that a Delegation of Services

Agreement is not required, they are not complying with their obligation to properly
respond to discovery and when the Defendants further make representations that
evidence does not exist, the Plaintiffs are entitled to rely on such representations.
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Stated another way, the Plaintiffs should not assume that the Defendants will misstate
the status of a document pertinent to the litigation. The Defendants had an obligation to
search for the Delegation of Services Agreement in good faith, and they did not do so.
2.

THE DEFENDANTS' COMME:NTS DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS

EREJUDICED THE PLAINTIFFS
With respect to State v. Raudebaugh, the Defendants argue that Raudebaugh
has no bearing on the present case because the court did not address the issue of
whether a prosecutor's comments during closing arguments constituted a basis for a
new trial. Plaintiffs' reliance on Raudebaugh is premised on the rule that the Cowi may
address !he issue of whether the Defendants' comments during closing arguments,
which mischaracterize the evidence, constitute fundamental error,

even

though no

objection was made during the argument. Raudebaugh,124 Idaho 758, 769, 864- P.2d
596, 607 (1993). Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Raudebaugh Court was addressing
the issue of prosecutoria! misconduct, but in so doing, the court determined that if the
prosecutor's statements in his closing arguments distorted the reasonable doubt burden
of proof, the error would be fundamental because lt would go to the foundation of the
case. Id. Similarly, in this case, the Defendants commented during closing arguments
that the Delegation of Services Agreement does not define the standard of care after no
expert at trial had opined that the Delegation of Services Agreement set forth the
standard of care. These statements distorted the Plaintiffs' burden of proof regarding
lhe standard of care and directly impacted !he foundation of the Plaintiffs' case.

3,

THE JURY WAS NOT INSTRUCTED ON THE LAW

The Defendants argue that the jury was properly instructed with respect to the
IDAPA regulations in Instruction No, 28.

That instruction, however, simply states that
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"the Court takes judicial notice of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act."

The

Court's taking judicial notice of the IDAPA regulations, while well-intended, does nothing
to instruct the jury on the law. Whether the Court takes judicial notice of evidence is
inconsequential to the jury. Moreover, the purpose in informing the jury that the Court
had taken judicial notice of the IDAPA regulations is unclear. It is difficult to understand
the objective in informing the jury of the Court's judicial notice of the law, but ruling that
the jury cannot consider it. If the Court does not instruct the jury on the law, then the
jury is preempted from carrying out its fundamental role.
Although the Plaintiffs were given the opportunity to cross examine Mr. Byrne
and Dr. Dille with respect to the IDAPA regulations and Mr. Byrne specifically stated that
the IDAPA regulations are the law that governs physician assistants in Idaho, without
I.he benefrt of knowing what that law is, the jury was precluded from applying the law to
the case. As fact finders, that is precisely what the jury's duty ls. The Defendants
contend that the Court properly precluded the IDAPA regulations from the jury's review
because they would have been confusing or misleading to the jury, and that they would
"invite (the jury) to interpret the law for themselves, rather than following the Court's
instructions on the law." The basic error in this argument is that the IDAPA regulations

are the law and it is the Court's duty to instruct the jury on ti1e law.
The Defendants assert that the IDAPA regulations are not clear because they do
not define certain terms used within the regulations.

For instance, the Defendants

argue, in part, !hat the IDAPA ;egulations do not articulate what it means to "manage"
the health care of a patient. The Defendants' argument must fall in two respects. First,
a monumental burden would be placed on the Board of Medicine if it were asked to
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define every word in a set of regulat1ons it promulgates. Secondly, asking a jury to
interpret the word "manage" on their own is hardly an unfeasible request.
rudimentary questions are asked of juries.

Far less

At the core of this issue, however, is that

the Board of Medicine was granted with the authority, by the legislature, to adopt
regulations pertaining to physician assistants to ensure that patients are protected from
the unauthorized or negligent care of physician assistants, and it is the Court's duty to
ensure that the legislature's intent is upheld by properly instructing the jury on the law.
The jury was not so instructed in this case.
The Defendants also argue that whether the Court admitted the IDAPA
regulations or not is a moot point because Defendant Dille would have instructed Mr.
Byrne to prescribe the same dose of Methadone that Mr. Byrne did to Mrs. SchmecheL
This argument mus! also fail. If the Court would have instructed the jury on the IDAPA
regulations and the jury concluded that Mr. Byrne was in violation of the regulations,
then Dr. Dille's after the fact statement that he wouid have treated Mrs. Schmechel the
same way Mr. Byrne did becomes a self-serving statement designed to shield himself
from liability.
In addition, the Defendants' argument with respect to Sanchez v. Galey is
misguided. The Plaintiffs do not contend that they established the necessary elements
to substantiate a ciaim of negligence per se. Rather, the Plaintiffs rely on Sanchez v.
Galey because the Court held that statutes and administrative regulations may define

the applicable standard of care owed. Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 617 733 P.2d

1234, 1242 (1986). In the present case, the IDAPA regulations unquestionably set forth
the required standard of care for physician assistants in Idaho and the Court in Sanchez
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recognized that such regulations provide the applicable standard of care to be applied
to a given case. Regulations that were designed to "govern the activities of persons
employed as physician assistants" would certainly bestow an appropriate standard of
care in a case that is centrally focused on the alleged negligence of a physician
assistant. IDAPA § 22.01.03.000 (2003).
Lastly, the Defendants' reliance on Alexander v. Conveyors & Dumpers from the
Fifth Circuit is misplaced and Alexander is not controfling in this Court.

Alexander

involved a products liability case over a conveyor belt in which the assumption of risk
was at issue. 731 F.2d i221 (5th Cir. 1984). The plaintiffs in that case argued the court
erred

in not giving the

plaintiffs' instructions pertaining to the i 957 American Standard

Safety Code for Conveyors. 731 F.2d at 1229. The court did not admit the safety code
because the plaintiff did not urge admission of the Code at trial and because the
relevant sections had already been read and shown to the jury. Id. In the case at hand,
the Plaintiffs strongly urged for the admission of the IDAPA regulations and the
regulations were not read and shown to the jury-rather, they were simply referred to
during cross examination.

4.

DR. SMITH'S TESTIMONY SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED

The Defendants contend that the Court properly allowed Dr. Smith to testify
regarding Mrs. Schmechel's cause of death. The Defendants assert that Dr. Smith had
a basis for changing his opinion regarding the cause of death due to his review of the
depositions of Dr. Groben and the deputy coroner. The Defendants contend that the
parties worked diligently to schedule depositions, and the Plaintiffs are not asserting
that the Defendants purposefully delayed the depositions so that Dr. Smith could
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change his opinion regarding the cause of death on the eve of trial. However, the fact is
that the late disclosure prejudiced the Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs were precluded from

obtaining an expert in cardiology that would provide testimony to counter Dr. Smith's.
Notably, long before Dr. Graben and the deputy coroner were ever deposed, at the time
of Mrs. Schmechel's death, they prepared written reports that disclosed the same
information regarding Mrs. Schmechel's death that was disclosed at their depositions.
After reading those reports, which were generated at the time Mrs. Schmechel died, Dr.
Smith could have formed the same opinion regarding the cause of Mrs. Schmechel's
death that he did on the eve of trial.
Contrary to the Defendants' .arguments, the Plaintiffs do not assert that the
Defendants purposefully "stone-walled" the Plaintiffs with the late disclosure of Dr.
Smith's opinions. However, the Plaintiffs were nevertheless "stone-walled" by the late
disclosure, and the prejudice that ensued runs directly against the policy grains of Rule

26 (e)(1)(B) articulated in the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Edmunds v. Kraner, 142
Idaho 867, 873 136 P,3d 338, 344 (2006).

5.

"RECKLESS" SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN BIFURCATED IN THE
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

With respect to the bifurcation of the "reckless" instruction, the Plaintiffs urge the
Court to recognize that when the instructions are taken as a whole, given the evidence
that was presented at trial, the instructions were confusing or misleading to the jury.
Regardless of the Plaintiffs' tactical decision to present testimony regarding the alleged
reckless conduct, the fact is that the Plaintiffs had to present their theory of the case
without ever knowing how the jury would be instructed. The prejudice that ensued from
the Court's withholding a ruling on the jury instructions is significant because the
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Plaintiffs were in the position of trying to postulate which standard the jury would have
for its deliberations.
The Defendants also contend that the jury could not have reached the issue of
whether the Defendants' conduct was reckless without first determining that the conduct
was negligent. While it is true that "reckless" conduct carries with it a higher degree of
culpability than negligent conduct, they are, nonetheless, two distinct standards. Either
the conduct was negligent, or it was reckless; the Defendants' conduct cannot be
characterized as both.
Lastly, the Defendants' assertions that instructing the jury on recklessness would
have prejudiced the Defendants because the issue of recklessness only applied to Mr.
Byrne must be disregarded.
applied

The Court could have easily ciarified the standard as

to each Defendant by providing separate jury instructions.
!I.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs respectfully request a new trial pursuant to IRCP 59(a)(1), (3) and (7)
because of irregularities, surprises, prejudices, and errors in law that occurred at trial.
The Idaho Ruf es of Civii Procedure warrant an opportunity for the Plaintiffs to have their
case tried free of obstructions that preclude their right to a fair trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS

WW

day of December, 2007.

ssman, of the firm
for the Plaintiffs
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Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
PO Box2720
Boise, !D 83701-2720
Richard E. Hall
Keely E. Duke
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, PA
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
PO Box 1271
Boise ID 83701
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U.S. Mail
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Facsimile (208) 388-1300
E-Mail
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Facsimile (208) 395-8585
E~Mail
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FAZtlfIBJAN 23

AM//: SJ

BY_-......_..,..,._~--

VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually,)
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal )
Representative of the Estate of
)
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, and )
ROBERT LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and )
)
TAMARA HALL, natural children
of ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased, )
)
Plaintiffs
)
)
)
vs.
)
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN )
)
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
)
Corporation and
)
THOMAS BYRNE, P.A.,

--~-DE:~~
Case No.: CV 2005-4345

MEMORANUM OPINION AND
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL

)

Defendants.

)

David E. Comstock, Taylor V. Mossman, Byron V. Foster, Boise, for the plaintiffs.
Steven J. Hippler and J. Will Varin, Boise, for defendants Dr. Dille and the
Southern Idaho Pain Institute.
Keely E. Duke and Chris D. Comstock, Boise, for defendant Byrne.
Introduction

Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(l),(3) and (7), Plaintiffs Vaughn
Schmechel, Robert P. Lewis, Kim Howard, and Tamara Hall (the "Schmechels") move
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this court for a new trial. For the reasons set forth herein, the Schmechels' motion is
hereby DENIED.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case involves a medical negligence action against defendants Dr. Clinton
Dille, M.D. ("Dr. Dille"), the Southern Idaho Pain Institute, and Mr. Thomas Byrne, P.A.
("Mr. Byrne"). This case was tried to a jury over a ten-day period beginning October 16,
2007. Both parties presented several expert witnesses and had disclosed other potential
experts. On October 30, 2007, the jury returned a unanimous verdict finding no
negligence on the part of defendants. The court entered judgment for Mr. Byrne on
November 5, 2007 and for Dr. Dille on November 9, 2007.
The Schmechels move for new trial on four separate grounds: (1) the court's
refusal to allow the Schmechels' experts to offer opinion testimony regarding the
Delegation of Services Agreement and its relation to the standard of care; (2) the court's
denying the Schmechels' motion to preclude Dr. Smith from testifying; (3) the court's
exclusion of the IDAPA regulations from the jury's review during deliberations; and (4)
the court's bifurcation of the issue of recklessness in the jury instructions. The court
will address each of these in turn.
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APPLICABLE LAW
A.

1.R.C.P. 59(a).

The Schmechels' motion for new trial is brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l),(3)
and (7), which provides as follows:

A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or any
part of the issues in an action for any of the following reasons:
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party or

any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.

,.

*
*
3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.

*

*

*

7. Error in law, occurring at the trial.
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l),(3),(7).
B.

Standard of Review.

The denial or grant of a motion for new trial is within the district court's
discretion, and an appellate court will only reverse the district court's decision "based
on an abuse of discretion." Gillingham Construction, Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Construction,

Inc., 142 Idaho 15, 121, 129 P.3d 946, 954 (2005). In determining whether a district court
abused its discretion, an appellate court reviews:
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
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its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason.

Id. (quoting Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. V. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993,
1000 (1991)).

1.

Rule 59(a)(l).

With regard to Rule 59(a)(l), the Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[i]n
evaluating whether an irregularity in the proceedings merits a new trial, a district court
takes into consideration whether the irregularity had any effect on the jury's decision."

Id. However, where a motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(l) is based on
misconduct, "the moving party has only the burden to establish that the misconduct
occurred. The party opposing the motion must then establish that the conduct could
not have affected the outcome of the trial." Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705,
711, 979 P.2d 107, 113 (1999).
2.

Rule 59(a)(3).

The Court has also held that a party moving for new trial based on "accident or
surprise" pursuant to Rule 59(a)(3) must show both "prejudice" and "that the alleged
accident or surprise is one that 'ordinary prudence could not have guarded against."'

Hughes v. State, Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement, 129 Idaho 558,562,929 P.2d 120, 124
(1996) (quoting I.R.CP. 59(a)(3)).
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3.

Rule 59(a)(7).

The Court has further explained a district court's duty under Rule 59(a)(7) as
follows:
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(7) states a district court may grant a
new trial for an 'error in law, occurring at the trial.' The district judge is
vested with wide discretion to grant or deny a new trial where substantial
rights of the aggrieved party are not affected and that party is not entitled
to a new trial as a matter of right. Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 645,
39 P.3d 577, 585 (2001). Where prejudicial errors of law have occurred,
however, the district court has a duty to grant a new trial under
Rule59(a)(7), even though the verdict is supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Id.

Craig Johnson Const., L.L.C. v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797, 800-01, 134 P.3d
648, 651-52 (2006). Regarding evidentiary rulings specifically, the Court noted that "[i]n
the case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, however, a new trial is merited only
if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties." White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882,
892, 104 P.3d 356, 366 (2004) (citing Highland Enters. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 345, 986
P.2d 996, 1011 (1999)).

DISCUSSION
A.

Exclusion Of Expert Testimony Regarding Delegation Of Services
Agreement.

The Schmechels move for new trial on several grounds in relation to the court's
exclusion of the Schmechels' expert testimony regarding the Delegation of Services
Agreement ("DSA") and how it relates to the standard of care. Specifically, the
Schmechels contend that under the circumstances, the exclusion of such evidence
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
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constitutes an "irregularity in the proceeding" under Rule 59(a)(l), an unfair surprise
under Rule 59(a)(3), and an error of law under Rule 59(a)(7).
1.

Overview of facts.

On May 1, 2006 the Schmechels requested that Mr. Byrne produce relevant
documents, including any DSA in effect in 2003. (See Foster Aff. Exhibit A.) On May 18,
2006 the Schmechels' counsel took the deposition of Mr. Byrne and questioned him
regarding a DSA in effect in 2003. Mr. Byrne produced the DSA in effect in 2004.
Counsel for Dr. Dille then represented that there was no DSA for 2003 because the
Board of Medicine did not begin requiring them until 2004. (Id.) Byrne also produced a
2001 Job Description at his deposition. There is no allegation or evidence that Dr.
Dille's counsel maliciously or in bad faith misrepresented the law regarding delegation
of services agreements at Byrne's deposition.
On June 29, 2006 the Schmechels again requested production of "any and all
delegation of services agreements pertaining to Thomas Byrne, PA." (Foster Aff. Exhibit
B, at 11.) Byrne responded to this request on July 14, 2006 by stating that "[d ]ocuments
responsive to this Request were produced at the deposition of Mr. Byrne on May 18,
2006." (Foster Aff. Exhibit C, at 4.)
Approximately fifteen months later, on October 4, 2007, counsel for the
Schmechels sent a letter to counsel for defendants explaining that ID APA regulations in
effect in 2003 required a written delegation of services agreement and requesting that
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defendants supplement their discovery. (See Foster Aff. Exhibit D.) After locating the
document in storage, Byrne provided the 2003 DSA on October 11, 2007, less than one
week before trial. (See Foster Aff. Exhibit F.) There is no allegation or evidence that
Byrne's delay in producing the document was malicious or in bad faith.
At no time did the Schmechels disclose expert testimony regarding the DSA or
the 2001 Job Description. The 2003 and 2004 DSA' s are very similar and the relevant
portion of the 2003 DSA that the Schmechels sought to have an expert testify about is
identical to the 2004 DSA.
At trial the Schmechels sought to introduce expert testimony regarding the 2003
DSA. Defendants objected on the grounds that this was undisclosed expert testimony
and the court sustained the objection. The court noted that it would consider allowing
such testimony on rebuttal. However, the Schmechels did not attempt to bring in such
evidence on rebuttal.
2.

Analysis.

Under the circumstances of this case, the exclusion of expert testimony regarding
the DSA does not constitute an irregularity in the proceeding, an unfair surprise, or an
error of law. The question of whether or not to exclude testimony for failure to timely
supplement discovery responses is vested in the trial court's discretion. Viehweg v.

Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 271, 647 P.2d 311, 317 (Ct. App. 1982). Specifically, a trial
court may exclude expert opinion testimony where the content of the opinion was not
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disclosed pursuant to discovery requests. I.R.C.P. 26(e)(4); see also Clark v. Ratay, 137
Idaho 343, 347, 48 P.3d 672, 676 (Ct. App. 2002).

It is clear here that the Schmechels never disclosed that their experts would
testify regarding the existence or contents of a DSA; however, the Schmechels argue
that the court nonetheless should have permitted such testimony because Byrne did not
produce the 2003 DSA until less than a week before trial. Although the court recognizes
that Byrne's delay in disclosing the document placed the Schmechels in a difficult
situation, the court determines that it properly exercised its discretion to exclude such
testimony. See Clark, 137 Idaho at 347, 48 P.3d at 676.
Although counsel for Dr. Dille, in May of 2006, misrepresented that a delegation
of services agreement was not required in 2003, the Schmechels had full access to the
ID APA regulations to discover this error. Furthermore, even though the Schmechels
had access to both the 2001 Job Description and 2004 DSA well in advance of trial, none
of the Schmechels' experts opined that defendants violated Idaho law regarding the
DSA and/or job description. Had expert disclosures been made, albeit regarding the
DSA from the wrong year, or the job description, or even regarding the IDAP A
regulations, such would have mitigated any surprise or late disclosure problem;
however, where such a disclosure was not made, the court determined that allowing
expert testimony at trial regarding the DSA, even though the DSA was disclosed very
late, would be improper.
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Considering that Dr. Dille's counsel misrepresented the IDAPA regulations on
May 18, 2006, the Schmechel' s had ample time to discover the error. However, between
July 14, 2006, when Byrne responded to the Schmechels' requests for production, and
October 4, 2007, when the Schmechels sent a letter requesting the 2003 DSA specifically,
the Schmechels took no action in this regard. As such, the late disclosure of the 2003
DSA on October 11, 2007 is not the type of "[a]ccident or surprise, which ordinary

prudence could not have guarded against" that warrants a new trial. LR.C.P. 59(a)(3)
(emphasis added).
Likewise, considering that prior to trial the Schmechels did not disclose potential
expert testimony regarding any DSA or the apparent failure to have a DSA in 2003, it
was within the court's discretion to exclude the testimony. Viehweg, 103 Idaho at 271,
647 P.2d at 317. Had the court permitted such testimony, defendants would have been
presented with undisclosed expert testimony which they argued at trial they were
unprepared to rebut. As such, the court properly used its discretion and the exclusion
was neither an irregularity in the proceeding or an error of law. LR.C.P. 59(a)(1),(7).
Moreover, the court allowed the Schmechels to inquire extensively of both Mr.
Byrne and Dr. Dille regarding the DSA and the alleged failure to comply with the
agreement and abide by Idaho law. While the legal standard in a medical malpractice
action requires expert testimony to establish breach of the applicable standard of care,
both Dille and Byrne were experts in their respective fields and the jury had ample
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evidence in this regard to review and weigh in determining whether a breach of the
standard of care occurred.
Thus, even if one were to view the court's exclusion of the Schmechels' expert
testimony regarding the DSA as an abuse of discretion, it would still not warrant a new
trial. In this case the jury found, even with the evidence elicited of Byrne and Dille by
the Schmechels, that Mr. Byrne did not act negligently in his treatment of Mrs.
Schmechel.
The court notes the Schmechels' argument that allowing expert opinion
testimony that Mr. Byrne violated the DSA may have impacted how the jury viewed the
credibility of defendants' witnesses, and thus may have influenced the jury's findings.
However, under the circumstances, the court's ruling to exclude such evidence was
appropriate. Again, the Schmechels had the opportunity to cross examine Mr. Byrne
during their case-in-chief; they also cross examined Dr. Dille regarding the DSA; lastly,
they presented argument regarding the DSA to the jury during their closing argument.
Considering the Schmechels' ability to impeach defendants' witnesses regarding the
DSA through these means, the excluded expert testimony likely would have had only
marginal effect, if any, on the credibility of defendants.
Finally, in excluding expert opinion testimony from the Schmechels' case in
chief, the court indicated that it would consider allowing such evidence on rebuttal.
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However, the Schmechels did not seek to offer such testimony at that juncture. As such,
the Schmechels have in effect waived the issue.
For the reasons stated above, this court determines that the Schmechels are not
entitled to a new trial on the basis that the court excluded their expert opinion
testimony regarding the DSA.

B.

Failure to Exclude Dr. Smith's Testimony.

Likewise, the Schmechels move for new trial in relation to Dr. Smith's Testimony
pursuant to Rule 59(a)(l), (3), and (7). For the reasons set forth herein, this argument
likewise does not merit a new trial.
1.

Overview of Facts.

On June 17, 2007 defendants disclosed expert testimony of Dr. James Smith as to
"[a]pplicable medical principles, causation, and damages." (Foster A££. Exhibit F, at 22)
(emphasis added.) Defendants disclosed the substance of Dr. Smith's opinions in
pertinent part as follows:
It is anticipated Dr. Smith will testify that the cause of Mrs. Schmechel's
death is uncertain and that another condition she had was just as, if not
more, likely to have caused her death than Methadone and/or
Hydrocodone. In providing this opinion, it is anticipated Dr. Smith will
rely on the descriptions provided regarding the scene of death and his
knowledge of Mrs. Schmechel's various co-morbid medical conditions and
personal habits.
(Id.)
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On June 20, 2007 counsel for Mr. Byrne sent a letter to the Schmechels' counsel
indicating that Dr. Smith could be deposed after Dr. Groben had been deposed. (See
Duke Aff. Exhibit 9). On July 31, 2007 Dr. Graben' s deposition was taken. Although
Dr. Smith was apparently available to be deposed in August 2007, the Schmechels'
counsel chose not to depose Dr. Smith. (See id. Exhibit 12.)
Due to scheduling difficulties on the part of both parties and witnesses, the
deposition of Shaiyenne Anton (also known as Shaiyenne Shindle) was not taken until
September 5, 2007. Counsel for defendants received the transcript of Ms. Anton's
deposition on September 24, 2007 and gave it to Dr. Smith for review on September 26,
2007. After Dr. Smith reviewed both Dr. Groben and Ms. Anton's depositions, Dr.
Smith apparently altered his opinion, and defendants supplemented Dr. Smith's
opinions on October 4, 2007 to indicate that "[i]t is anticipated that Dr. Smith will testify
that on a more probable than not basis, the likely cause of Ms. Schrnechel' s death was a
cardiac death, likely fatal dysrhythmia. He will testify that the dysrhythmia was caused
by her underlying cardiac and other co-morbid conditions." (Foster Aff. Exhibit G, at 5.)
The defendants contend that Ms. Anton's deposition brought to light facts that
caused Dr. Smith to change his opinion. Specifically, Ms. Anton testified in her
deposition that it was her opinion that Mrs. Schmechel was awake when she died. (See
Duke Aff. Exhibit 17, at 44:1 -4.) At trial the Schmechels objected to Dr. Smith's
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testimony in this regard on the basis that it was expert opinion that had not been timely
disclosed.

2.

Analysis.

a.

The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Smith's
testimony.

The Schmechels contend that they were unfairly prejudiced by the late disclosure
that Dr. Smith would testify that Ms. Schmechel's death was more likely than not
caused by cardiac failure. Rule 26( e)(l) states that
[a] party is under a duty seasonably to supplement the response with
respect to any question directly addressed to . . . the identity of each
person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject
matter on which the person is expected to testify, and the substance of the
person's testimony.
I.R.C.P. 26(e)(1). Rule 26(e)(4) then provides that "[i]f a party fails to seasonably
supplement the responses as required in this Rule 26(e), the trial court may exclude the
testimony of witnesses or the admission of evidence not disclosed by a required
supplementation of the responses of the party." I.R.C.P. 26(e)(4). The Court in Edmunds

v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006), explained the duty that Rule 26(e)(4)
imposes as follows:
This Court has held that this rule "unambiguously imposes a continuing
duty to supplement responses to discovery with respect to the substance
and subject matter of an expert's testimony where the initial responses have
been rejected, modified, expanded upon or otherwise altered in some manner."
Clarie v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 157, 45 P.3d 810, 813 (2002) (quoting Radmer
v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 813 P.2d 897 (1991)) (emphasis added). In
fact, litigants are subject to sanctions, including the exclusion of expert
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testimony, when they have failed to supplement an expert's opinion. See,
e.g., Radmer, 120 Idaho at 91, 813 P.2d at 902.

Id. at 874, 136 P.3d at 345. Under this Rule, the determination of whether to impose the
sanction of excluding the testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265,271,647 P.2d 311,317 (Ct. App. 1982).
Here, defendants supplemented their disclosure approximately eleven days prior
to trial. Thus, the issue is whether defendants "seasonably" supplemented their
discovery response within the meaning of Rule 26(e)(1). Under the circumstances,
defendants' supplementation was seasonable. As set forth above, in June of 2007,
defendants disclosed Dr. Smith as an expert, indicated that he could be deposed after
Dr. Groben, and made him available for deposition. However, the Schmechels chose
not to depose Dr. Smith. Due primarily to a scheduling problem that delayed the
deposition of Ms. Anton, her deposition transcript was not available for review until
late September. Within days of when Ms. Anton's deposition transcript was prepared
Dr. Smith reviewed it, and shortly thereafter defendants supplemented their disclosure
of Dr. Smith's testimony.
Although the supplemental disclosure was made a mere eleven days prior to
trial, under the circumstances the disclosure was "seasonably" made and defendants'
conduct was appropriate under Rule 26(e)(1). The court takes note of the Supreme
Court's commentary that
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[w]e do not look favorably upon discretionary decisions by district judges that
encourage last-minute witness disclosure and unreasonably prevent plaintiffs
from responding, particularly in complex medical malpractice cases where
experts will be furnishing the jury with the bulk of the necessary, and often
technical, facts.

Edmunds, 142 Idaho at 873, 136 P.3d at 344. However, this court does not view
defendants' supplemental disclosure of Dr. Smith's opinion the type of "last-minute
witness disclosure [that] unreasonably prevent[ed] plaintiffs from responding." Id.
(emphasis added).
The late disclosure of Dr. Smith's modified opinion was due to scheduling
difficulties that inevitably arise in a trial of this magnitude, rather than inaction on the
part of either party. In this regard, Dr. Smith's testimony is distinguishable from the
Schmechels' excluded expert testimony regarding the DSA, discussed above. The late
disclosure of the Schmechels' DSA expert testimony was due in part to a delay of more
than a year by the Schmechels in addressing the issue of whether a DSA was required in
2003. However, there is no such period of inaction by defendants with regard to Dr.
Smith's testimony.
Additionally, unlike the Schmechels' excluded expert testimony regarding the
DSA, with regard to Dr. Smith's testimony the opposing party was given early notice as
to its general nature and basis. Specifically, defendants' initial disclosure of Dr. Smith's
testimony stated that Dr. Smith would testify regarding "causation" and that he "would
rely on the descriptions provided regarding the scene of the death." (Foster Aff. Exhibit
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F, at 22.) As Ms. Anton was one of the coroners that provided information regarding
the death scene, the Schmechels were placed on notice that Ms. Anton's deposition may
be relevant to Dr. Smith's opinions. Although apparently unavoidable scheduling
difficulties accounted for Ms. Anton's deposition not being taken until September 2007,
the Schmechels may have been to able avoid much of the surprise in Dr. Smith's
opinion by taking his deposition when he was made available in August 2007 and
acquiring a better general understanding of Dr. Smith's opinions. However, the
Schmechels chose not to depose him.
The Schmechels contend that because, based on the initial disclosure of his
testimony, "Dr. Smith did not seem to have an opinion, on a more likely than not basis,
the Plaintiffs did not depose him. The Plaintiffs did so under the assumption that the
Court would not allow an expert to testify unless the expert's opinion met the 'more
likely than not' standard." (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for New
Trial, at 7.) Be that as it may, the Schmechels were given notice in June 2007 that
defendants intended to call Dr. Smith regarding causation.
For the reasons discussed above, under Rule 26(e)(l) and (4) defendants timely
supplemented their disclosure of Dr. Smith's testimony and the court did not abuse its
discretion in permitting such testimony to be admitted. As such, the Schmechels are not
entitled to a new trial under Rule 59(a)(l), (3), and/or (7).
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b.

Any possible error was harmless and does not warrant a new trial.

However, even if the court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Smith to testify,
such error would be harmless error because it did not affect the outcome of the case.

Gillingham Const., 142 Idaho at 23, 121 P.3d at 954 (2005) ("In evaluating whether an
irregularity in the proceedings merits a new trial, a district court takes into
consideration whether the irregularity had any effect on the jury's decision."); White v.

Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 892, 104 P.3d 356, 366 (2004) ("In the case of an incorrect ruling
regarding evidence, however, a new trial is merited only if the error affects a substantial
right of one of the parties."); Cf Archer v. Shields Lumber Co., 91 Idaho 861, 870, 434 P.2d
79, 88 (1967) ("[T]he general rule which prevails in this jurisdiction is that a motion for a
new trial should not be granted unless it appears that a different result would follow a
retrial.").
Dr. Smith's testimony related solely to causation. The jury found both
defendants did not act negligently in their treatment of Mrs. Schmechel. As such,
testimony regarding the cause of Mrs. Schmechel' s death had no bearing on the
outcome of the case; regardless of the cause of her death, the jury found that defendants
acted reasonably. Accordingly, if allowing Dr. Smith to testify constituted an unfair
surprise, irregularity in the proceeding, or error of law, a new trial is nonetheless not
warranted because it does not "appear[] that a different result would follow a retrial"
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where Dr. Smith would not be permitted to testify. Archer, 91 Idaho at 870, 434 P.2d at
88.
For these reasons, the court finds that the Schmechels are not entitled to a new
trial because the court allowed Dr. Smith to testify.

C.

Failure to Adequately Instruct the Tucy and/or Admit IDAP A
Regulations.
1.

Overview.

The Schmechels requested that the "Rules for the Licensure of Physician
Assistants," ID APA§ 22.01.03 (2003), be admitted into evidence and that the jury be
allowed access to them during deliberations. The Schmechels also requested the
following negligence per se instruction regarding the IDAPA regulations:
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 54-806(2), the Idaho State Board of
Medicine is authorized to promulgate rules to govern activities of persons
employed as physician assistants by persons licensed to practice medicine
in Idaho. A "supervising physician" is a person registered by the Board
who is licensed to practice medicine in Idaho, who is responsible for the
direction and supervision of the activities of the physician assistant. A
"physician assistant" is a person who has been authorized by the Board of
Medicine to render patient services under the direction of a supervising
physician.
Under applicable Board of Medicine regulations, the defendants in
this case were required to have in place a delegation of services agreement
which defined the working relationship between Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne.
Pursuant to Board of Medicine regulations, a physician assistant may
issue written or oral prescriptions only in accordance with approval and
authorization granted by the Board of Medicine and in accordance with
the delegation of services agreement and shall be consistent with the
regular prescriptive practice of the supervising physician.
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Under the Southern Idaho Pain Institute' s Delegation of Services
Agreement applicable to this case, Mr. Byrne was authorized to conduct
an initial evaluation of patients seen in the facility, to do a full history and
physical, and thereafter document his findings and recommendations. It
was the duty of Dr. Dille, pursuant to the Board of Medicine regulations
and the Delegation of Services agreement, to review the recommendations
of Mr. Byrne and to thereafter confirm his findings and to determine a
treatment plan.
Failure to follow the duties imposed by the Board of Medicine
regulations and/or the Delegation of Services Agreement is a violation of
the applicable standard of care.
(Plaintiff's Supplemental Jury Instructions, at 6.)
The court rejected the Schmechels' request to admit the IDAP A regulations and
did not give the requested jury instruction. Rather, the court allowed counsel to
question wih1esses regarding the regulations, read portions of the regulations, and
show portions of the regulations during wimess examination. The court then instructed
the jury as follows regarding the ID APA regulations:
You are instructed that the court takes judicial notice of the Idaho Administrative
Procedures Act, § 22.01.03 (2003, entitled "Rules for the Licensure of Physician
Assistants." The rules were in effect in 2003.
(Final Jury Instructions, No. 28.)
2.

Analysis.

a.

The court did not err in failing to give a negligence per se
instruction.

Regarding a trial court's determination on jury instructions, the Court explained
as follows:
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The correctness of jury instructions 'is a question of law over which this
Court exercises free review, and the standard of review of whether a jury
instruction should or should not have been given, is whether there is
evidence at trial to support the instruction.' " Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho
744, 750, 86 P.3d 458,464 (2004) (quoting Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156,
45 P.3d 810, 812 (2002)). A requested jury instruction must be given if it is
supported by any reasonable view of the evidence, Bailey, 139 Idaho at
750, 86 P.3d at 464, but the determination of whether the instruction is so
supported is committed to the discretion of the district court. State v.
Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 552, 21 P.3d 483, 489 (2001). Clearly, a requested jury
instruction need not be given if it is either an erroneous statement of the
law, adequately covered by other instructions, or not supported by the
facts of the case. State v. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 89, 831 P.2d 555, 557 (1992).
Even so, when the instructions taken as a whole do not mislead or
prejudice a party, an erroneous instruction does not constitute reversible
error. Bailey, 139 Idaho at 750, 86 P.3d at 464.

Craig Johnson Const., 142 Idaho at 800, 134 P.3d at 651.
Thus, jury instructions are considered proper if, "when considered as a whole
and not individually, [they] fairly and adequately present the issues and state the
applicable law." Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 343, 986 P.2d 996,
1009 (1999); see also Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 882, 42 P.3d
672, 675 (2002).
As for a negligence per se instruction, the Court has held that in order for such an
instruction to be given
the statute must (1) clearly define the required standard of conduct; (2) the
statute or regulation must have been intended to prevent the type of harm
the defendant's act or omission caused; (3) the plaintiff must be a member
of the class of persons the statute or regulation was designed to protect;
and (4) the violation must have been the proximate cause of the injury.
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Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393,395, 34 P.3d 1076, 1079 (2001) (citing Sanchez v. Galey, 112
Idaho 609, 617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1986)).
Under this standard, the court properly denied the Schmechels' request for a
negligence per se instruction for two reasons. First, the ID APA regulations do not
"clearly define the required standard of conduct." Id. Specifically, the IDAPA
regulation in effect in 2003 permitted a physician assistant to "[d]iagnose and manage
minor illnesses or conditions" and "manage the health care of the stable chronically ill
patient in accordance with the medical regimen initiated by the supervising physician."

ID APA 22.01.03.28.03 and 22.01.03.28.04 (2003). However, the regulations do not define
terms such as "minor illness" or "manage." Likewise, there is no evidence that these
terms have definite and universally understood meanings within the .medical
community. The fact that these regulations do not clearly define the applicable
standard of care is illustrated by the fact that the Schmechels' own expert testified at
trial that Mr. Byrne's treatment of Mrs. Schmechel did not violate Idaho law.
Specifically, Dr. Lordon testified as follows
Q. [By Ms. Duke] Physician assistants evaluate and treat patients, and
they do minor medical procedures; correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And that's all appropriate for them to do those things?
A. Yes it is.
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Q. It was certainly okay, in your opinion, for Mr. Byrne to prescribe
medications?
A. Absolutely.
Q. That's something that Idaho law permits him to do?

A.Yes.
Q. And Idaho law also allows physician assistants to evaluate, plan, and
implement plans of care, and you have no problem with that; correct?

A. I have no problem with that.
Q. So you are in no way critical of the fact that Mr. Byrne treated Mrs.
Schmechel; correct?

A. No, none whatsoever.
(Duke Aft. Exhibit 5, at 66:13-67:25.) Because there could be considerable disagreement
regarding what certain key terms mean, the IDAPA regulation does not "clearly define
the required standard of conduct."
Second, in order to warrant a negligence per se instruction, "the violation must
have been the proximate cause of the injury." Ahles, 136 Idaho at 395, 34 P.3d at 1079.
Here Dr. Dille testified that he would not have done anything differently in treating
Mrs. Schmechel than Mr. Byrne did. (See Duke Aff. Exhibit 18, at 29:17-21 (deposition
testimony); Duke Aff. Exhibit 19, at 39:11-17 (trial testimony).) Thus, considering that
Dr. Dille would have offered the same care to Mrs. Schmechel had he been the one
treating her; the fact that Mr. Byrne treated her could not have been the proximate cause
of her injury.
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The Schmechels contend that this view is supported only by Dr. Dille' s "selfserving" testimony that he would have treated Mrs. Schmechel the same as Mr. Byrne
did. Nonetheless, considering this testimony in light of the fourth prong of the test laidout in Ahles, this court finds that the jury instructions as given, without the requested
negligence per se instruction, more "fairly and adequately present the issues and state
the applicable law." Highland Enterprises, 133 ldaho at 343, 986 P.2d at 1009.
Finally, even assuming that the four prongs discussed above had been met, such
that a negligence per se instruction would normally be appropriate, it is doubtful that a
negligence per se instruction should be given in a medical negligence action brought
pursuant to LC.§§ 6-1012 and 1013. Under LC.§ 6-1012 a medical negligence plaintiff
"must, as an essential part of his or her case in chief, affirmatively prove by direct
expert testimony and by a preponderance of all the competent evidence, that [the]
defendant ... negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice .
. . ." LC. § 6-1012.
The Schmechels' proposed instruction would have instructed the jury that
"[f]ailure to follow the duties imposed by the Board of Medicine regulations and/or the
Delegation of Services Agreement is a violation of the applicable standard of care."
(Plaintiff's Supplemental Jury Instructions, at 6.) Accordingly, this proposed instruction
would have allowed the jury to find that defendants breached the standard of care by
violating the ID APA regulations, regardless of whether the Schmechels proved as much

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

23

using direct expert testimony as required by the statute. Given the apparent conflict
between LC.§ 6-1012 and the Schmechels' proposed negligence per se instruction, the
court properly refused to give such an instruction.

b.

The court did not err in keeping the IDAPA regulations
from the jury.

Likewise, the court properly used its discretion in refusing to admit the ID APA
regulations into evidence and thus preventing the jury from having them during
deliberations. Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, a trial court is given considerable
discretion to exclude evidence because it would potentially confuse the jury. See

Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 127 Idaho 565,573, 903 P.2d 730, 738 (1995); I.RE. 403.
The "Rules for the Licensure of Physician Assistants" are intricate and technical. In
exercising its discretion the court believed that allowing the jury access to such IDAPA
regulations during deliberations would have created a significant risk of confusing the
jury with aspects of the regulations that were irrelevant to the case. Additionally,
counsel were able to read relevant portions of the regulations and question witnesses on
them during examination; counsel were also free to reference the regulations and show
them to the jury via the in-court video device, during closing argument.
Thus, no substantial right of the Schmechels was affected by the failure to admit
the IDAPA regulations as an exhibit. See Alexander v. Conveyors & Dumpers, Inc., 731
F.2d 1221, 1229 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[N]o substantial right of Alexander's was affected by
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the failure to admit the Code as an exhibit because the relevant sections had already
been read and shown to the jury.")

D.

Bifurcation of Recklessness Issue.

The Schmechels also move for new trial on the basis that the court's bifurcation
of the recklessness issue constitutes an irregularity in the proceeding under Rule
59(a)(l) and/or an error of law under Rule 59(a)(7). This court determines a new trial is
not warranted on this basis because the recklessness issue was properly bifurcated from
the initial jury instructions.
1.

Overview.

The Schmechels requested that the court instruct the jury on recklessness.
However, the court did not give such a jury instruction in the Final Jury Instructions
given prior to deliberations; rather, the court indicated that it was inclined to give such
an instruction if the jury returned a verdict with a damages award in excess of the
statutory non-economic damages cap. Because the jury returned a verdict finding no
negligence, no recklessness instruction was ever given.

2.

Analysis.

The Schmechels contend, on two bases, that they are entitled to a new trial
because the court did not give a reckless instruction with the Final Jury Instructions.
First, the Sc:hmechels contend that, because Dr. Lipman testified at trial that defendants'
conduct was reckless, the lack of such an instruction "likely confused or misled the
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jury." (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, at 12.) Second, the
Schmechels contend that "[i]n preventing the Plaintiffs from arguing recklessness in the
closing argument and in precluding the jury from even considering whether the
defendants' conduct was reckless, the Court in effect, severed the Plaintiffs' case and
prevented the jury from making their own determination on whether the defendants'
conduct was reckless." (Id. at 12-13.)
The court determines that both of these arguments are without merit. As noted
above, jury instructions are proper if, "when considered as a whole and not
individually, [they] fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable
law." Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 343, 986 P.2d 996, 1009 (1999)
(emphasis added). Reversible error occurs when an instruction misleads the jury or
prejudices a party. Howell v. Eastern R.R., Inc., 135 Idaho 733, 740, 24 P.3d 50, 57 (2001).
In order to prove recklessness in a medical negligence action, the Schmechels
were necessarily required to prove negligence. See Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed. (West
1999) ("Recklessness involves a greater degree of fault than negligence but a lesser
degree of fault than intentional wrongdoing."); see also§ I.C. 6-1012 (requiring a medical
malpractice plaintiff to prove that the defendant "negligently failed to meet the
applicable standard of care") (emphasis added).
Thus, the jury could not have found recklessness without first finding
negligence. And until the jury returned a verdict finding negligence and damages in
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excess of the non-economic damages cap, recklessness was not a relevant issue in this
case. Considering the complexity of this case and the number of jury instructions
already required, the court properly bifurcated the recklessness issue so the jury could
focus only on the immediately relevant issues.
However, even if the court erred by not giving a recklessness instruction in the
Final Jury Instructions, this was harmless error. In Gillingham Construction the court
held that "[i]n evaluating whether an irregularity in the proceedings merits a new trial,
a district court takes into consideration whether the irregularity had any effect on the
jury's decision." 142 Idaho at 23, 121 P.3d at 954 (2005). In the case at hand the absence
of a reckless instruction had no effect on the outcome of the case and did not affect the
substantial rights of the Schmechels.
Moreover, this court does not agree that the jury was confused or misled by the
presentation of evidence regarding recklessness in the absence of an instruction on the
subject. The evidence regarding recklessness was limited to brief testimony by Dr.
Lipman; it is not as though this whole case centered on recklessness and then the court
did an "about face" at the end of trial, taking the recklessness issue from the jury. See
Lipman Transcript, p. 73:1- 77:20. Accordingly, this court finds that the court's
bifurcation of the recklessness issue is not grounds for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(l),
(3), and/or (7).
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Schmechels' Motion for New Trial is

DENIED.

~-

Dated t h i s ~ day of January, 2008.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

G. RICHARD BEV AN
District Judge
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INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the court on the motion/memoranda of the defendants
seeking an award of costs in the above-entitled matter pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1) and
681. The defendants are awarded costs as set forth herein.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The procedural history in this case is set forth in this court's opinion on the
plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, filed on January 23, 2008.
LEGAL STANDARDS

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(A) provides that a prevailing party shall
be awarded costs, unless otherwise provided by the court or limited by the rules. Rule
54(d)(1)(C) provides that a party is entitled to certain costs actually paid as a matter of
right.

A.

Undisputed Costs.

There is no dispute about the following costs, which are awarded to each party
as a matter of right:
Dr. Dille:
•

Court Filing Fees

•

Defendant Expert Dr. Hare

$52.00
2,000.00

The defendants both reference Rule 68 in their motions, but the record is silent regarding an offer of
judgment from either defendant in the case. The plaintiffs have stipulated in their response to each defendant's
motion that the defendants are the prevailing party in this case.
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•

Defendant Expert Dr. Binegar

2,000.00

•

Reporting and Transcriptions

6,137.07

Total

$10,189.07

Mr. Byrne:
•

Court Filing Fees

$52.00

•

Fees for Service

320.00

•

Defendant Expert Chris Kottenstette

2,000.00

•

Defendant Expert Dr. Smith

2,000.00

•

Reporting and Transcriptions

9,594.77
$13,966.77

Total

B.

Disputed Costs as a Matter of Right.

The plaintiffs have objected to costs claimed as a matter of right for exhibit
preparation, in the amount of $500.00 for each defendant. The court concludes that
such amounts have been certified as paid by each defendant; however, Dr. Dille and
Mr. Byrne indicate only that such amounts were paid for exhibits prepared for the trial;
no certification is made that such exhibits were admitted as required by the Rule. See

George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 115 Idaho 386, 371, 766 P.2d 1267, 1272 (Ct. App.
1988) (holding that the trial court erred by ordering non-discretionary costs for an
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exhibit prepared for trial but not admitted into evidence). The court finds that the
defendants offered several exhibits into evidence, and prepared juror notebooks and
exhibits for the court. As such, the court will award Dr. Dille $300.00 for these costs
pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(6). Mr. Byrne will be awarded $500.00 for these costs
since he incurred more, in total, for these expenses, than did Dr. Dille.
Mr. Byrne also claims $2,000 for payment of Dr. Kimberly Vorse' s deposition fee.
While Dr. Vorse is a physician who specializes in pain management, she testified at trial
as a fact witness, having treated Mrs. Schmechel for several years. Dr. Vorse did not
testify as an expert witness during the trial. As such, the court will not award her
deposition cost as a matter of right.
C.

Discretionary Costs.

1.

Legal Standard.

A trial court may award a prevailing party "necessary and exceptional costs
reasonably incurred" which "should in the interest of justice be assessed against the
adverse party." LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). An award of discretionary costs is subject to the
trial court's discretion. Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 59,
995 P.2d 816, 829 (2000). When ruling upon objections to discretionary costs, the trial
court is required to "make express findings as to why such specific item of discretionary
cost should or should not be allowed." Id. However, express findings must only be
made "'as to the general character of requested costs and whether such costs are
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS'
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necessary, reasonable, exceptional, and in the interests of justice is sufficient to comply
with this requirement.' Thus, the district court need not evaluate the requested costs
item by item. Id. Hayden Lake Fire Protec. Dist., 141 Idaho at 314, 109 P.3d at 168 (citing

Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 384, 973 P.2d 148, 155 (1999); Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho
492,494,960 P.2d 175, 177 (1998))."
2.

Dr. Dille's Discretionary Costs.

Dr. Dille seeks discretionary costs in the amount of $24,889.65 for expert witness
fees exceeding amounts allowed as a matter of right. He also seeks copying costs of
$87.72, $587.00 for copies of or access to learned treatises, and $8,482.39 for travel
expenses. The court will analyze these costs in reverse order.

a.

Travel expenses.

A court may evaluate whether costs are exceptional within the context of the
nature of the case. Id.; see also City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580,588, 130 P.3d 1118,
1126 (2006); Hayden Lake Fire Prat. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161, 168
(2005). In this case all counsel assumed responsibility for this case knowing that it was
a Twin Falls case, involving Twin Falls witnesses. Parties are certainly free to hire
counsel of their choosing, but in so doing, the parties must bear the brunt of the
required travel from Boise to Twin Falls. Moreover, this court concludes that travel
expenses are the norm in a modern medical malpractice case. As such, the costs
associated with travel to take depositions are part of "modern litigation overhead,"
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which are not exceptional in any way. Travel expenses must therefore be borne by the
parties themselves. Accord Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377,381, 973 P.2d 148, 152 (1999).
The court will, however, award Dr. Dille the travel expense associated with the
second trip to Salt Lake City to complete the deposition of Dr. Lordon, in the amount of
$446.52. The court does find that these expenses were exceptional, and were
necessitated by Dr. Lordon calling the deposition short due to personal circumstances.
While Dr. Lordon's scheduling difficulties are not the fault of the Schmechel family,
neither are they the fault of Dr. Dille. The equities in the case regarding this specific
cost request should be borne by the plaintiffs.

b.

Learned Treatises.

The court declines to award any discretionary cost for learned treatises because
such costs are not necessary and exceptional costs which should, in the interest of
justice, be borne by the Schmechel family in this case.

c.

Copying Costs.

The court will not award Dr. Dille copying costs beyond the $300.00 discussed
above. As set forth, such expenses were awarded in a total amount that the court
determined was just and proper given the circumstances of the case.

d.

Expert Witness Fees Exceeding Amounts Allowed.

The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that
[i ]n reviewing a grant or denial of discretionary costs, the key issue is
whether the record indicates express findings by the district court as to
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS'
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whether a cost was necessary, reasonable, exceptional and should be
awarded in the interests of justice. The district court does not have to
engage in a lengthy discussion of these factors.

Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005).
Accordingly, in using its discretion under Rule 54(d)(1)(D), this court considers whether
Dr. Dille' s expert witness fees were necessary, reasonable, and exceptional and whether
they should be awarded in the interests of justice.
As to whether costs are exceptional, the Court has stated that "[a] [trial] court
may evaluate whether costs are exceptional within the context of the nature of the case."

City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580,588, 130 P.3d 1118, 1126 (2006) (emphasis
added). In Seubert, a condemnation case, the party seeking costs argued that the trial
court erred in finding that the costs were not exceptional because "multimillion dollar
condemnation cases are exceptional in themselves, requiring extensive expert testimony
and use of exhibits and models." Id. The Court upheld the denial of costs where the trial
court found such costs were "'routine costs associated with modern litigation overhead'
in a condemnation case." Id. at 588-89, 130 P.3d at 1126-27 (quoting trial court).
Likewise, in Hayden Lake the Court upheld a trial court's denial of expert witness
fees where "the trial court considered the nature of [the] case as a class action and its
effect on numerous Idaho businesses and found that although expert witnesses were
necessary and their fees reasonable, the costs were not exceptional for a class action
suit." 141 Idaho at 314, 109 P.3d at 168.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS'
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Similarly, in Fish v. Smith, 960 P.2d 175, 131 Idaho 492 (1998), the Court upheld a
trial court's finding that expert witness fees and related costs were not exceptional in a
personal injury case. The Fish Court quotes the trial court at length:
The trial court pointed out that "expert witnesses-medical;
neuropsychological; accident reconstruction; vocational; and so forthroutinely testify in serious personal injury actions," and that "[t]he vast
majority of litigated personal injury cases . . . routinely require an
assessment of the accident and the alleged injuries by various sorts of
doctors of medicine, accident reconstructionists, vocational experts and so
on." The trial court concluded: "This is the very 'nature' of these sorts of
cases. Similarly, travel and lodging expenses for expert witnesses and
attorneys and photocopy expenses are not exceptional but, on the
contrary, are common 'in a case of this nature."'

Id. at 494, 960 P.2d at 177. Accordingly, based on this precedent, it is clear that this
court "may evaluate whether costs are exceptional within the context of the nature of
the case." Seubert, 142 Idaho at 588, 130 P.3d at 1126.
Additionally, the Court has held that discretionary costs may be considered
exceptional if the case itself is exceptional. Specifically, in Hayden Lake the Court
explained as follows:
This Court has always construed the requirement that a cost be
"exceptional" under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) to include those costs incurred
because the nature of the case was itself exceptional. In Great Plains Equip.,
the Court specifically noted that discretionary costs, including those for
expert witness fees, were "exceptional given the magnitude and nature of
the case." [Great Plains Equip. Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho
466, 475, 36 P.3d 218, 227 (2001)]. Furthermore, Fish held that a district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying discretionary costs associated
with expert witness fees where the trial court had properly determined
the case itself was not "exceptional." Fish, 131 Idaho at 493, 960 P.2d at
177. Certain cases, such as personal injury cases generally involve copy,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS'
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travel and expert witness fees such that these costs are considered
ordinary rather than "exceptional" under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). See e.g.
[Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 384, 973 P.2d 148, 155 (1999)].

Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 314, 109 P.3d at 168. Accordingly, in determining whether the
case is exceptional, a court may consider the "magnitude and nature of the case." Id.
(citing Great Plains Equip., 136 Idaho at 475, 36 P.3d at 227). 2
Therefore, analyzing whether the factors set forth in Rule 54(d)(l )(D) are present,
this court first concludes that the expert witness fees incurred by Dr. Dille were
necessary and reasonable. The experts that Dr. Dille retained were necessary to
establish his defense to the claims asserted by the plaintiffs throughout this litigation.
Furthermore, while the witness fees charged by experts in this case were large, they
were reasonably incurred, as the fees charged for both sides' experts were in. the same
approximate range.
However, considering the nature and magnitude of the case, this court finds that
such expenses were not exceptional. Although medical negligence cases are more
complicated and involve more experts than some other types of cases, the court does
not consider the case exceptional solely because it involved medical negligence. As
discussed above, the Court has held that trial courts did not abuse their discretion in

2

In their briefing, both Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne also cite the court to Roe v. Harris, 128 Idaho 569, 917 P.2d 403
(1996). Both defendants cite to this case, without pinpoint reference, for the holding that "that costs may be
exceptional based on the nature of the case itself, i.e., if the case itself is exceptional." (Dille's Amended Verified
Memo of Costs, at 6; Byrne's Amended Verified Memo of Costs, at 6.) However, this court could find no holding
remotely similar to this in the three short paragraphs in Harris that discuss Rule 54(d)(l)(D). See Harris, 128 Idaho
at 574,917 P.2d at 408. Rather, in Harris the Court did not mention how the nature of the case related to Rule
54(d)(l)(D) and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying discretionary costs. Id
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finding that costs were not exceptional in a multimillion dollar condemnation
proceeding, a class action involving numerous Idaho businesses, and a serious personal
injury case involving medical and other experts. Seubert, 142 Idaho at 588-98; Hayden

Lake, 141 Idaho at 314, 109 P.3d at 168; Fish, 131 Idaho at 493-94, 960 P.2d at 175-76. As
such, it is well within this court's discretion to find that this medical negligence case is
not such an exceptionally complex case as to warrant a finding that expert fees involved
were exceptional.
Furthermore, there is nothing else about the "magnitude and nature" of this
particular medical negligence case to support a finding that the expert witness costs
involved here were beyond the norm in such cases. See Great Plains Equipment, 136
Idaho at 226-27; 36 P.3d at 474--75. Specifically, LC.§ 6-1012 requires a medical
negligence plaintiff to, "as an essential part of his or her case in chief," present "direct
expert testimony." LC.§ 6-1012. Thus, it is likewise necessary for a medical negligence
defendant to present expert testimony in order to mount a suitable defense and the
expert witness fees required for this case are not beyond what is to be generally
expected in a medical negligence case.
The court notes the defendants' argument that the complexity of this case was
increased because of the Schmechels' numerous and changing claims relating to
defendants' conduct and Mrs. Schmechels' death. Nonetheless, the court finds that the
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issues involved in this case were not so complex that the cost for the necessary experts
was exceptional under Rule 59(d)(1)(D).
The court notes the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in Puckett v. Verska,
144 Idaho 161, 158 P.3d 937 (2007), where the Court upheld a trial court's award of
$120,714.85 in discretionary costs in a medical malpractice action. Id.; (see Byrne's Aff.
of Counsel Exhibit A, Puckett, Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintiff's Request for Costs.)
In Puckett the Court upheld the award, noting that the trial court properly "considered
the exceptionality of the costs in light of the 'long course of litigation and complexity of
this case."' Puckett, 144 Idaho 169, 158 P.3d at 945. This court does not dispute that the
trial court in Puckett properly exercised its discretion in determining that the costs
involved in that case were exceptional under Rule 54(d)(l)(D). However, this court
finds that unlike Puckett, the case at hand was not such a long and complex medical
malpractice case that the costs involved were exceptional. Rather, Dr. Dille's expert
witness costs are better described as "routine costs associated with modern litigation
overhead." Seubert, 142 Idaho at 589, 130 P.3d at 1127.
Because the court finds that Dr. Dille' s expert wih,ess fees were not
"exceptional," under Rule 54(d)(l)(D) such an award will not be made in this case.
Therefore, the court need not consider whether it would be in the interests of justice to
award such costs.
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3.

Mr. Byrne's Discretionary Costs.

Thomas J. Byrne seeks discretionary costs in the amount of $27,796.16 for expert
witness fees exceeding amounts allowed as a matter of right. He also seeks costs for
trial exhibits of $928.85, $774.60 for copying expenses, $87.65 for learned treatises and
$7,699.36 for travel expenses. The court will analyze these costs in reverse order.

a.

Travel expenses.

As set forth above for Dr. Dille, the court concludes that the costs for travel are
assumed by the parties hiring out-of-town counsel for a Twin Falls case. Also as set
forth above, travel expenses are the norm in a modern medical malpractice case. As
such, the costs associated with travel to take depositions are part of "modern litigation
overhead," which are not exceptional. Travel expenses must therefore be borne by the
parties themselves. Accord Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 381, 973 P.2d 148, 152 (1999).
The court will, however, award Mr. Byrne some of the travel expense associated
with the second trip to Salt Lake City to complete the deposition of Dr. Lordon, in the
total amount of $776.79. The court reaches this conclusion on the same rationale as set
forth above for Dr. Dille; however, the court concludes that the claimed $597.51 for
miscellaneous lodging, meals and taxi fares to be excessive, in light of the fees requested
for two other such trips to Salt Lake City, which average less than $150.00 for each. As
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such, the court's award limits the amount for the miscellaneous expenses incurred to
complete Dr. Lordon's deposition to $200.00.

b.

Copy and Exhibit Costs.

The court awarded Mr. Byrne the $500.00 maximum for exhibit preparation as a
matter of right in this case. The court declines to award any additional costs for
copying or exhibits, on the basis that the court concludes $500.00 is fair for these
expenses. The court also concludes that such additional expense is part of modern
litigation overhead. Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 381, 973 P.2d 148, 152 (1999).
c.

Learned Treatises.

The court declines to award any discretionary cost for learned treatises because
such costs are not necessary and exceptional costs which should, in the interest of
justice, be borne by the Schmechel family in this case.
e.

Expert Witness Fees Exceeding Amounts Allowed.

The court reaches the same conclusion regarding these costs as it did for Dr.
Dille, supra. Again, the court concludes that Mr. Byrne's retained or called experts were
necessary and that the amounts these experts charged were reasonable. However, this
court concludes that such costs are not exceptional within the meaning of Rule
54(d)(l)(D) for the same reasons as have already been stated, supra, pp. 6-11.
Accordingly, such costs are denied.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS FOR COSTS

13

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Counsel for the defendants are ordered to
prepare amended judgments in conformity with the following within seven (7) days of
the date hereof:
Dr. Dille:

•

Costs as a Matter of Right

•

Disputed Costs as a Matter of Right

300.00

•

Discretionary Costs

446.52

$10,189.07

Total

$10.935.59

Mr. Byrne:
•

Costs as a Matter of Right

•

Disputed Costs as a Matter of Right

500.00

•

Discretionary Costs

776.79

$13,966.77

Total

$15,243.56

IT rs so ORDERED.
Dated this d/~ay of January, 2008.

~I

G. RICHARD BEV AN
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY

d___

I, Sharie Cooper, hereby certify that on the
day of January, 2008, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order and Memorandum was mailed, postage paid,
and/or hand-delivered to the following persons:

David Comstock
COMSTOCK & BUSH
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500
P.O. Box 2774
Boise, ID 83701-2774

Attorney for Plaintiffs
Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY
601 W. Bannock St.
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720

Attorney for Defendants, Dr. Dille and
the Southern Idaho Pain Institute
Keely E. Duke
HALL FARLEY OBERRECT & BLANTON
702 W. Idaho Street
P.O. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701-1271

Attorney for T.J. Byrne P.A.
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually,
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P.
LEWIS, KlM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

Case No. CV-05-4345

AMENDED JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and
JOHN DOE, I through X,
Defendants.

The above captioned case was tried to a jury from October 16 through October 30, 2007, and
consistent with the jury verdict rendered herein by the jury on the 30th day of October, 2007;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does order, that, consistent with the Special Verdict,
judgment is entered in favor of defendant Thomas J. Byrne, against plaintiffs, and that all claims
AMENDED JUDGMENT - I

asserted by plaintiffs against Thomas J. Byrne are hereby dismissed with prejudice, and with
plaintiffs taking nothing thereby.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, and this does order, that, consistent with the

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motions for Costs dated January 24, 2008,
Thomas J. Byrne is awarded costs in the amount of$15,243.56.
DATED this

d_ day of February, 2008.
/
G. Richard Bevan, District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ; / day of February, 2008, I caused to be served a true copy
of the foregoing AMENDED JUDGM~ by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:
David Comstock
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500
P.O. Box 2774
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721

-0.s.
Mail, Postage Prepaid
_ _ Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy

Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY
601 W. Barmock ST.
PO Box 2720
Boise ID 83701-2720
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, MD. and
Southern Idaho Pain Institute
Fax No.: (208) 388-1300

~ . S . Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
__ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy

Keely E. Duke
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701

....------U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
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David E. Comstock ISB # 2455
Taylor Mossman ISB # 7500
COMSTOCK & BUSH
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500
P.O. Box 2774
Boise, ID 83701-2774
Telephone: (208) 344-7700
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721
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Byron V. Foster, ISB # 2760
Attorney At Law
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500
P.O. Box 1584
Boise, ID 83701-1584
Telephone: (208) 336-4440
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually,
and as Surviving Spouse and
Personal Representative of the
Estate of ROSALIE SCHMECHEL,
deceased, and ROBERT P. LEWIS,
KIM HOWARD and TAMARA HALL,
natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

VS.

CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A.,
and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I
through X,
Defendants/Respondents.

NOTICE OF APPEAL • 1

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-05-4345

NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, Thomas Byrne, P.A., AND HIS
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, Hall Farley, Oberrecht and Blanton, P.A., 702 West Idaho,
Suite 700, P.O. Box 1271 Boise, ID, 83701, and Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho
Pain Institute, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, Givens Pursley, LLP, 601 W.
Bannock Street P.O. Box 2720, Boise, Idaho 83701-2720, AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellants, Vaughn Schmechel, Robert Lewis, Kim

Howard and Tamara Hall, appeal against the above-named Respondents to the Idaho
Supreme Court from the District Court's Order denying the Plaintiffs' Motion for New
Trial entered in the above-entitled action on the 23 rd day of January, 2008, the
Honorable Richard Bevan presiding.
2.

That the Plaintiffs/Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme

Court, and the District Court's Decision referred to in paragraph 1 above is appealable
under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1) and (5), I.A.R.
3.

The Appellants request a review of the District Court's denial of the

Plaintiffs/Appellants' Motion for New Trial.
4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

The Appellants request the preparation of the Standard Transcript

pursuant to I.A.R. 25(c) of the jury trial which occurred on October 16, 2007, through
October 30, 2007. Additionally, the Plaintiffs/Appellants request the preparation of the
following:
a.

The reporter's transcript for all parties' opening and closing
arguments;
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b

The reporter's transcript for the conferences on requested jury
instructions, the objections of the parties to the instructions, and the
court's ruling thereon;

c.

The reporter's transcript for any conferences on questions received
from the jury during deliberations; and

d.

The reporter's transcript for the hearing on Plaintiffs/Appellants'
Motion for New Trial which occurred on December 17, 2007.

6.

The appellant requests the following documents be included in the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR.:
a.

Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions dated October 9, 2007;

b.

Plaintiffs' First Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions dated
October 18, 2007;

c.

Plaintiffs' Bench Brief Re: Proposed "Reckless" Instruction dated
October 18, 2007;

d.

Plaintiffs' Objections to the Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions
dated October 19, 2007;

e.

Plaintiffs' Supplemental Bench Brief Re "Reckless" Jury Instruction
dated October 23, 2007;

f.

Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions dated
October 26, 2007;

g.

Defendants' Joint Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury
Instructions dated October 26, 2007;

h.

Final Jury Instructions dated October 30, 2007;
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i.

Defendants' Joint Objections to Court's Proposed Final Jury
Instructions dated October 30, 2007;

j.

Special Verdict Form dated October 30, 2007;

k.

Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial dated November 19, 2007;

I.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial dated
November 19, 2007;

m.

Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New
Trail and exhibits thereto dated November 19, 2007;

n.

Defendants Clinton Dille and Southern Idaho Pain Institutes'
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial dated December 3,
2007;

o.

Affidavit of Steven J. Hippler in Support of Defendants Clinton Dille
and Southern Idaho Pain Institutes' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion
for New Trial dated December 3, 2007;

p.

Defendant Thomas J. Byrne'e Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial dated December 3, 2007;

q.

Affidavit of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant Thomas J.
Byrne's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for New
Trial dated December 3, 2007;

r.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New trial
dated December 13, 2007;

s.

Amended Affidavit of Counsel, Keely E. Duke, with attachments,
dated December 17, 2007;

NOTICE OF APPEAL · 4

552

t.

Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial dated
January 23, 2008.

7.

I certify:
a.

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the
reporter.

b.

That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee
for preparation of the reporter's transcript.

c.

That the estimated Jee for preparation of the clerk's record has
been paid.

d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R.

DATED This

::?.

re day of March, 2008.

Taylor rvi'ossman, of the Firm
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·:s r-tP

I hereby certify that on this
day of March, 2008, l served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon:
~

Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
PO Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720

D
D
D

Richard E. Hall
Keely E. Duke
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, PA
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
PO Box 1271
Boise ID 83701

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 388-1300

E-Mail

Wu.s. Mail

D
D
D

----~....

Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 395-8585
E-Mail

/r-:M [Af VL__
~-~.,,

T~ylo1 Mossman
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DISTRICT COURT
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.n
Keely E. Duke
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!SB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com

Chris D. Comstock

13y_ _ _ _ _ _ _,

!SB #6581; cdc@hallfarley,com
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HALL, FARLEY, OBERREClfT & BLANTON, P,A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271

CLERr(
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Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585
W:\2\2404.53\F.equcsl for t\dditioncl' Oocwnems on Appeal.doe

Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byme
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTR1CT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

VAUGHN SCI·IMECHEL, individually,
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal

Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P.
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

Case No. CV-0S-4345

.DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE,
P,A.'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and
JOHN DOE, I through X,
Defendants.
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TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS AND THE PARTIES'
ATTORNEYS OF RECOlUJ, AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVEENTITLED COURT.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the respondent, Thomas J. Byrne, ln the above entitled
proceeding hereby requests, pursuant to Rule 19 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the inclusion of the
following material in the Reporter's Transcnpt and Clerk's Record in addition to that required to be
included by the Idaho Appellate Rules and the Notice of Appeal:
1.

Requested additions to the Reporter's Transcript:

a.

The reporter's transcript for the hearing on the parties' motions ln limine
which occurred on October 11, 2007 and all other hearings and/or the
court's rulings on the parties' motions in lhnine; and

b.

The reporter's transcript fur al! hearings and/or the conferences held on
the record during trial and outside the jury's presence.

2.

Requested additions to the Clerk's Record:
a.

Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning, dated March 2, 2006;

b.

Notice of Jury Trial Setting, Pretrial Conference and Order Governing
Further Proceedings, dated March 9, 2006;

c.

Plaintiffs' Expert Witness :Disclosure, dated April 19, 2007;

d.

Plaintiffs' First Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures, dated June 15,
2007;

e.

Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's Disclosure ofExpett Witnesses, dated June
18, 2007;

f

Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures, dated
September 6, 2007;
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g.

Plaintiffs' Third Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures, dated
Septernber 11, 2007;

h.

Defendant Thomas Byrne, P .A.'s Exhibit List, filed September 24, 2007;

i.

Defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute Trial
Exhibit List, filed September 24, 2007;

j.

Defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. wd Southern Idaho Pain Institute' s Trial
Witness List, filed September 24, 2007;

k.

Pretrial Conference Order Pursuant to I.R. C.P. 16(d), dated September
25, 2007;

l.

Defendant Thomas Byrne, P.A.' s Witness List, dated September 26,
2007;

m.

Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, filed September 26, 2007;

n.

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, filed
September 26, 2007;

o.

Defendant Thomas J. Byrnes' Motion in Limine Re: Various Issues, filed
October 1, 2007;

p.

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Thomas Byrne, P.A.' s Motion in
Limine Re Various Issues, filed September 27, 2007;

q.

Defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southem Idaho Pain Institute's
Motions in Limine, filed September 28, 2007;

r.

Defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's
Memo1andum in Support ofMotions in Limine, filed October 1, 2007;
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s.

Memorandum in Support of Thomas J. Byrne's Motion in Limine Re:
Various Issues, filed October 1, 2007;

t.

Affidavit of J. Will Varin irt Support of Clinton Dille and Southern Idaho

Pain Institute' s Motions in Limine, filed October 1, 2007;
u.

Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain lnstitute's
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, filed October 4, 2007;

v.

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, filed
October 4, 2007;

w.

Defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A.'s Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine, filed October 4, 2007;

x.

Defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. 's Joinder in Clinton Dille and Southern

Idaho Pain Instliute's Motion in Limine, filed October 4, 2007;
y.

Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motions in Limine, filed
October 5, 2007;

z.

Affidavit of J. Will Varin in Support of Clinton Dille and Southern Idaho
Pain Institute' s Response to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, filed October 5,
2007;

aa.

Defondant Thomas J. Byrne's Supplemental Disclosure of Expert
Witnesses, filed October 5, 2007;

bb.

Plaintiffs' Fourth Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, filed October

5, 2007;

DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE, P.A. 'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCR!PT AND RECORD • 4
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cc.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, filed
October 9, 2007;

dd.

Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute' s Reply
to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motions in Limine, filed October
9, 2007;

ee.

Defo11dants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute' s
Joinder in Defendant Byrne's Motion in Limine, filed October 9, 2007;

ff.

Defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P .A.'s Proposed Special Verdict Form, filed
October 9, 2007;

gg.

Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's Trial Brief, filed October 9, 2007;

hh.

Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's, P.A.' s Proposed Jury Instructions, filed
October 9, 2007;

ii.

Defendant Thomas Byrne, P.A. 's Joinder in Clinton Dille, M.D. and
Southern fdaho Pain Institute's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to

Defendants Motions in Limine, filed October 10, 2007;
jj.

Defendants' Joint Exhibit List, filed on October 10, 2007;

kk.

Defendant Clinton lJille, M.D. and Southem Idaho Pain Institute' s Trial
Brief, filed October 10, 2007;

11.

Defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Jury
Instructions, dated October 10, 2007;

mm.

Affidavit of Chris D. Comstock Regarding the Parties' Motions in
Limine, filed October 15, 2007;

DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE, P.A,'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD· 5
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t. V,

nn.

Defendants Clinton DJIJe, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute'sFirst
Supplemental Jury lnstructkms, filed October 15, 2007;

oo.

Order Re: Motions in Limine, filed October I6, 2007;

pp.

Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Rebuttal Testimony of Dr.
Lipman, filed October 30, 2007; and

qq.

Declaration of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Objection to Proposed
Rebuttal Testimony of Dr. Lipman, filed October 30, 2007.

3.

rcertify that a copy of this request for additional transcripts has been served on

each court reporter of whom a 1ranscript is requested s named below at the addresses set out below:
Name and address: Virginia Bailey, P.O. Box 126, Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126
I further certify that this request for additional record has been served upon the clerk oftbe
district court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED t;his

./J.!!aay of March, 2008.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT
& BLANTON, P.A.

k

By{LQ~

{J · ·

Keely E. Duke - Of the Finn
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byrne

DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE, PA'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD· 6
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of March, 2008, I caused to be served a true copy of
the foregoing DEFENDANT TB:OMAS J. BYRNE, P.A.'8 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
TRANSCRIPT AND RECO'.RD, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:
David Comstock
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush
199:N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500
P.O. Box 2774
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721
Steven J. Hippler

GIVENS PURSLEY
601 W. Bannock ST.
POBox2720
Boise ID 83701-2720
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, M.D. and
Southern Idaho Pain Institute
Fax No.: (208) 388-1300

/4s. Mail, l'ostage Prepaid

I-land Delivered
__ Overnight Mail
__ Telecopy

/4. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hattd Delivered

_
Ovemigb.t Mail
__ Telecopy

Keely E. Duke

DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE, P.A.'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD· 7
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·

Steven J. Hippler ISB #4388
J, WIii Varin ISB #6981
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300

S:ICLIENTS\740512\Roqu..t for AddlUonal Roeorde.ooe

Attorneys for Defendants, Clinton Dille, M.D.
and Southern Idaho Pain Institute
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF lWIN FALLS
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, Individually, and :
as Surviving Spouse and Personal i
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE :
SCHME.CHEL, deceased, and ROBE.RT :
P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA:
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE :
SCHMECHEL, deceased,
:
Plaintiffs,

''

Vs.

'''

CLINTON DILLE, M.D., · SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X,

:
:
:'
:'

'

Defendants,

Case No. CV 05 4345
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLS,
M,D, AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN

INSTITUTE'S REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS AND
RECORDS

'''

''

TO: · THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS AND THE PARTIES'
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD AND THE REPORTER AND CLERK OF
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Defendants/Respondents, Clinton Dille,
M.D. and the Southern Idaho Pain Institute, in the above entitled proceeding hereby
request, pursuant to Rule 19 of the Idaho Appellate R.uies, the inclusion of the following
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILL~, M,D, AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTe'S REQUEST l'OR
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS ANO RECORDS.• 1
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Page , or ,

material in the Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record in addition to that required to
be included by the Idaho Appellate Rules and the Notice of Appeal:
1.

Reque11ted Additions to Report's Transcript:

a. The report's transcript for all hearings and/or the oourt's rulings on the
parties' Motions in Limine, including those hearings conduct on
October 11, 2007 and those conducted between October 15-31, 2007;

and
b. The report's transcript for all hearings and/or the conferences held on
the record during trial and outside the Jury's presence.

2.

Requested Additions to Clerk's Record:

File Date on

Document

ROA

Order for Scheduling Conference and Order RE:

a.

12/14/2005

Motion Practice

b.

02/15/2006

Order for Scheduling Conference and Order RE:
Motion Practice

C.

03/02/2006

Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning

d.

03/09/2006

Notice Of Ju,y Trial Setting, Pretrial Conference
And Order Governing Further Proceedings

e. · 04/20/2007

Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Disclosures

f,

06/18/2007

Plaintiffs' First Supplemental Expert Witness
Disclosures

g.

06/25/2007

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum

h.

06/27/2007

Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces
Tacum of Arthur G. Lipman, Pharm. D

DISFE!NDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M.D. AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'S REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS AND RECORDS • 2
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i.

06/27/2007

Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces
Tecum of Stephen P. Lordon, M.D.

j.

08/13/2007

Second Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition
Duces Tecum of Stephen P. Lordon, M.D.
(Change of Location)

k.

08/13/2007

Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces
Tecum of Jim Keller, M.P .H., PA-C

I.

08/13/2007

Second Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition
Duces Tecum of Arthur G. Lipman, Pharm. D.

m.

09/25/2007

Pretrial Conference Order Pursuant to I.R.C.P.
16(d)

n.

09/10/2007

Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Expert Witness
Disclosures

o.

09/11/2007

Plaintiffs' Third Supplemental Expert Witness
Disclosures

p.

09/26/2007

Plaintiffs' Motion In Llmlne

q.

09/26/2007

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion in
Llmine

r.

09/27/2007

Affidavit of Counsel In Support of Defendant
Thomas Byrne, P.A.'s Motion in Li mine Re:
Various Issues

s.

09/28/2007

Defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern
Idaho Pain Institutes' Motions In Limine

10/01/2007

Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern
Idaho Pain Institutes' Memorandum in Support
of Motions in Llmine

t.

DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M,D, ANP SOUTHERN IOAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'$ RE!QUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS AND RECORDS • 3
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u.

10/01/2007

Memorandum In Support of Thomas J. Byrne's
Motion in Limine Re: Various Issue&

V.

10/01/2007

Affidavit of J. Will Varin in Support of Clinton
Dille and the Southern Idaho Pain lnstltute's
Motions in Limine

w,

10/04/2007

Defendants Clinton Pille, M.D. and Southern
Idaho Pain tnstltute's Response to Plaintiffs'
Motion in Limine

)(,

10/04/2007

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant
Thomas Byrne's Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine

y,

10/04/2007

Defendant Thomas J, Byrne's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion in limine

10/04/2007

Defendant Thomas Byrne, P.A.'s Jolnder In
Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain
lnstitute's Motion in Limine

aa. 10/05/2007

Memorandum In Response to Defendant's
Motions in Limine

bb, 10/05/2007

Affidavit of J. WIii Varin in Support of Clinton
DIiie' and the Southern Idaho Pain lnstitute's
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine

cc. 10/05/2007

Defendant Thomas J, Byrne's Supplemental
Disclosure of Expert Witnesses

dd,

Plaintiffs' Fourth Supplemental Expert Witness
Disclosure

%.

10/05/2007

ee. 10/09/2007

~

Pretrial Memorandum

DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLI:, M,D, ANO SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'S REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS AND RECORDS • 4 .
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ff.

10/09/2007

Affidavit of Byron V. Foster In Support of
Plaintiffs' Pretrial Memorandum

gg,

10/09/2007

Reply Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion In Limine

hh.

10/09/2007

Defendants Clinton D.ille, M.D. and Southern
Idaho Pain lnstitute's Reply to Plaintiffs'
Response to Defendants' Motions in Limine

ii.

10/09/2007

Defendants Clinton DIiie, M.D. and Southern
Idaho Pain lnstitute's Jolnder In Defendant
Byrne's Motion In Llmlne

"·

10/09/2007

Defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A.'s Proposed
Special Verdict Form

kk.

10/09/2007

Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's Trial Brief

II.

10/09/2007

Defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A.'s Proposed
Jury Instructions

mm. 10/10/2007

Defendant's Thomas Bryne, P.A.'s Jofnder in
Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain
lnstitute's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to
Defendants' Motions in Limine

nn.

10/10/2007

Defendant Clinton Dille' M.D. and Southern
Idaho Pain lnstitute's Trial Brief

00,

10/10/2007

Defendants Clinton Dilte, M.D. and Southern
Idaho Pain lnstitute's Jury lns!ruction1;

pp, 10/12/2007

Second Supplemental Trial Memorandum Re:
Plaintiffs' Expert Jim Keller fax

DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M.D. AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'S REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS AND RECORDS • 6
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qq. 10/15/2007

Second Supplemental Trial Memorandum Re:
Plaintiffs' Expert Jim Keller

rr.

10/15/2007

Affidavit of Chris D. Comstock Regarding the
Parties' Motions in Limine

ss. 10/15/2007

Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southam
Idaho Pain lnstitute's First Supplement Jury
Instructions

tt.

Order Re: Motions In Limine

10/16/2007

uu. 10/26/2007

Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Proposed Jury
Instructions Filed

vv.

Final Jury Instructions

10/30/2007

. Objection to Plaintiffs'
ww. 10/30/2007 · Defendants'
Rebuttal Testimony of Dr: Upmari

3.

Proposed

xx.

10/30/2007

Declaration of Counsel in Support of
Defendants' Objection to Proposed Rebuttal
Testimony of Dr. Lipman

yy.

01/23/2008

Memorandum Opinion end Order RE: Plaintiffs'
Motion for New Trial

zz.

~

Coples of all exhibits admitted into evidence,
excluding Exs. 227-227H (actual pills and pill
bottles from Coroner's office)

I certify that a copy of this request for additional transcripts has been

served on each court reporter of whom a transcript is requested as named below
at the address set out below:
Virginia Balley, P,0, Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0126.
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I further certify that this request for additional record has been served
upon the clerk of the district court and upon all parties required to be served
Idaho Appellate Rules.

GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP

JJU0--
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CERTl!"ICATI: OF SERVICE

J1~f

I hereby certify that on this
March 2008, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
David E. Comstock
COMSTOCK & BUSH
198 N. Capitol Blvd. #500
P.O. Box 2774
Boise. ID 83701-2774
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Richard E. Hall
Keely E. Duke
Hell Farley Oberrecht & Blanton PA
702 W. Idaho Street
P.O. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701-1271
Attorneys for Defendant, T. J, Byrne P.A.
Virginia Bailey, Court Reporter
P.O. Box 126
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126

_ _ U.S. Mail
_
Overnight Mail
!:land Delivery
- ~ -Fax 344-7721

_u,S.Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ __,1:iand Delivery
_:?Fax 395-8585
..,...,....U.S. Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
_
Hand Delivery
Fax

J. W !Varin

DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILI.E, M,D, AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'$ REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS ANO RECORDS - 8
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ORIGINAL

rwmiTR/CT COURT
/Di,HO

'/h[tgo.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL

D1Stltl/!8:1l[AY 30 PM J:

-y1/

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TIAM.M..EALLS..........
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually,
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased,
and ROBERT P LEWIS, KIM HOWARD
and TAMARA HALL, natural children of
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A.,
and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I
through X,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-05-4345

___
12

CLERK

-DEPUTY

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENT PENDING THE APPEAL

Defendants.
_____________

THIS MATTER Having come before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay
Execution of Judgment Pending the Appeal and the Court having been advised in the
premises; a telephonic hearing was held on May 28, 2008.

Having considered the

arguments of the parties and the relevant legal and factual foundations therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER That:
Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Execution of the Judgment Pending the Appeal is
hereby GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER That:
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(15), the posted bond amount for 136% of
the Judgment, or $35,603.64 will remain with the Clerk of the Court. To the extent that

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXTEND AUTOMATIC STAY - 1
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the Clerk is able to place the bond in an interest bearing account, while retaining control
of the bond with the Court, the Court directs the Clerk to do so.
DATED THIS

f:I"

day o ~

, 2008.

1/A:1,&2

~ r i c t Judge Richard Be

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-3zl_

lfl~ ,

I hereby certify that on this
day of
2008, I served a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrum~ethod indicated below, upon:

Er

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
E-Mail

Richard E. Hall
Keely E. Duke
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, PA
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
PO Box 1271
Boise ID 83701

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 395-8585
E-Mail

David E. Comstock
Taylor L. Mossman
Comstock & Bush
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 344-7721
E-Mail

Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
PO Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720

D
D
D
D
D
D

D
D
D

P.O.Box 2774
Boise, ID 83701

-~~
Clerk of the Court

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT- 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually and as
surviving spouse and Personal Representative
of the Estate of Rosie Schmechel, deceased
and ROBERT P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD
and TAMARA HALL, natural children of
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
VS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 05-4345

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)
)
)
)

CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
Corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A.,
and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X, )
)

Defendants/Respondents.

)

I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify that the
foregoing CLERK'S RECORD on Appeal in this cause was compiled and bound under my
direction and is a true, correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents requested by
Appellate Rule 28.

I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled
cause, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court
this 12'' day of June, 2008.
KRISTINA GLASCOCK
Cl

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

t::
t1

'? (.,'1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually and as
surviving spouse and Personal Representative
of the Estate of Rosie Sclnnechel, deceased
and ROBERT P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD
and TAMARA HALL, natural children of
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased,
Plaintiffs/ Appellants,

w

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
Corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A.,
and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X,
Defendants/Respondents.

CASE NO. CV 05-4345

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify:
That the following is a list of exhibits to the record that have been filed during the
course of this case.
Plaintiff's Expert Witness Disclosures, Filed April 20, 2007
Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's Disclosure of Expert Witnesses, Filed June 18, 2007
Affidavit of Connsel in Support of Defendant Thomas Byrne, P.A. 's Motion in Limine
RE: Various Issues, Filed September 27, 2007
Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institutes' Memorandum in
Support of Motions in Limine, Filed October 1, 2007
Memorandum in Support of Thomas J. Byrne's Motion in Lirnine Re: Various Issues,
Filed October 1, 2007
Affidavit of J. Will Varin in Support of Clinton Dille and The Southern Idaho Pain
Institnte's Motions in Limine, Filed October 1, 2007

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 1

Affidavit of J. Will Varin in Support of Clinton Dille and The Southern Idaho Pain
Institute' s Response to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, Filed October 5, 2007
Affidavit of Byron Foster in Support of Plaintiffs' Pretrial Memorandum, Filed
October 9, 2007
Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, Filed October 9, 2007
Defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. 's Proposed Jury Instructions, Filed October 9, 2007
Defendant Clinton Dille M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Trial Brief, Filed
October 10, 2007
Defendants Clinton Dille M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Jury Instructions,
Filed October 10, 2007
Affidavit of Chris D. Comstock Regarding the Parties' Motions in Limine, Filed
October 15, 2007
Supplemental Bench Brief Regarding Jury Instruction on Reckless Conduct, Filed
October 23, 2007
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, Filed
November 17, 2007
Defendant Thomas J. Byrne's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for
New Trial, Filed December 3, 2007
Affidavit Keely E. Duke in Support of Thomas J. Byrne's Memorandum in Opposition
to Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, Filed December 3, 2007
Affidavit of Steven J. Hippler in Support of Clinton Dille and the Southern Idaho Pain
Institute's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, Filed December 3, 2007
Amended Affidavit of Counsel, Dated Received December 18, 2007, THIS
DOCUMENT DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN FILED WITH THE DISTRICT
COURT
Court's Exhibit 1 (Judgment upon special verdict CV 04-3002)
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
records)
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's

Exhibit 1 (9/26/03 -9/30/03 handwritten office note - Bryne)
Exhibit 2 (9/26/03 typed office note - Bryne)
Exhibit 4 (9/29/03 typed office note - Bryne)
Exhibit 6 (9/30/03 typed office note- Bryne)
Exhibit 7 (medication log from clinic)
Exhibit 8 EXCLUDING pages 15 through 20 (Southern Idaho Pain Institute medical
Exhibit 9 (Southern Idaho Pain Institute appointment record)
Exhibit 10 (handwritten note re medications by Thomas Bryne, PA)
Exhibit 11 (photograph of pill container methadone)
Exhibit 14 (graphic record of pill counts)
Exhibit 17 (Twin Falls County Coroner's Autopsy Report)

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 2

Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's

Exhibit 19-1 (photo of Ms. Sclnnechel)
Exhibit 19-2 (photo of Mr. and Ms. Sclnnechel)
Exhibit 19-3 (photo of Kaylee and Ms. Sclnnechel)
Exhibit 19-4 (photo of Ms. Schmechel and Kim's twins Kaylee and Kris)
Exhibit 20-1 (Valentines Day card to Rosalie from Vaughn)
Exhibit 20-2 (Napa Valley post card to Rosalie from Vaughn)
Exhibit 20-3 Anniversary card from Rosalie to Vaughn)
Exhibit 20-4 (birthday card from Tammy to Mom)
Exhibit 20-5 (card to Rosalie from Kin:)
Exhibit 22 (certificate of death -Rosalie Schmechel)
Exhibit 23 (prescription script 9/26/03 methadone ex 4 to Jensen depo)
Exhibit 25 (information leaflet from pharmacy)
Exhibit 29 (obituary of Rosalie Sclnnechel)
Exhibit 30 (pamphlet from funeral)
Exhibit 40 (delegation of services agreement)
Exhibit 45 page 5 (Dr. Binegar web page printout)

Defendant's Exhibit 14A (pill count)
Defendant's Exhibit 200B (9/18/03 completed pain questionnaire Southern Idaho Pain
Institute)
Defendant's Exhibit 200J (9/29/03 office note Southern Idaho Pain Institute
Defendant's Exhibit 200K (9/30/03 office note Southern Idaho Pain Institute)
Defendant's Exhibit 202 pages 1 through 72 (Physician's Center's medical records for Ms.
Schemechel)
Defendant's Exhibit 202I (Diagnostic Imaging report)
Defendant's Exhibit 202J (2/16/88 lab report)
Defendant's Exhibit 202K (4/20/95 lab report)
Defendant's Exhibit 202L (10/08/97 lab report)
Defendant's Exhibit 202M (5/1/01 lab report)
Defendant's Exhibit 202N (12/16/02 lab report)
Defendant's Exhibit 203 pages 48, 87, 88, 90 and 91 only (Sun Valley Pain Management
medical records for Rosalie Schmechel)
Defendant's Exhibit 203A (9/16/03 Chart note Dr. Kimberly Vorse)
Defendant's Exhibit 205 pages 1, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 (10/02/03 TFCO Sheriff's
report)
Defendant's Exhibit 206 (TFCO Sheriff's photographs page 3 c-pap machine)
Defendant's Exhibit 207 pages 7 through 17 (10/03/03 TFCO Coroner's Report)
Defendant's Exhibit 208 (TFCO Coroner's Photo)
Defendant's Exhibit 211 (Pharmacy records, The Medicine Shoppe, computer printout)

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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Defendant's Exhibit 217 (The Medicine Shoppe, prescription script and computer generated
label Hydrocodone 9/26/03)
Defendant's Exhibit 218 (computer generated copy of prescription) SAME AS PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT 23
Defendant's Exhibit 219 (patient information leaflet from the Medicine Shoppe)
Defendant's Exhibit 220 (patient information leaflet) SAME AS PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 25
Defendant's Exhibit 221 (oxycontin label 9/18/03 photograph)
Defendant's Exhibit 223 (methadone label 9/26/03)
Defendant's Exhibit 223A (methadone pills - photograph)
Defendant's Exhibit 233 (11/14/01 employment contract/job description of Thomas J. Bryne
w/Southern Idaho Pain Institute
Defendant's Exhibit 239 (Southern Idaho Pain Institute's land line phone records and home
phone land line records of Dille)
Defendant's Exhibit 240 (cell phone records of Dille)
Defendant's Exhibit 241 (Cell phone records of Bryne)
Defendant's exhibit 242, (personal phone records of Mr. Bryne)
Defendant's Exhibit 243 (phone records land line of Vaughn Schmechel)
Defendant's Exhibit 244 (phone records cell phone of Vaughn Schmechel)
Defendant's Exhibit 245 (Robert Lewis cell phone records)
Defendant's Exhibit 246 (phone records of Tammy Hall)
Defendant's Exhibit 24 7 (ceU phone records of Kim Howard)
Defendant's Exhibit 248 page 4 (2006 tax records)
Defendant's Exhibit 249 page 4 (2005 tax records)
Defendant's Exhibit 250 Page 4 (2004 tax record)
Defendant's Exhibit 251 Page 4 (2003 tax record)
Defendant's Exhibit 277 (notes of Robert Lewis)

EXHIBITS NOT ADMITTED
Plaintiff's Exhibit 33 pages 11 and 12 (graphs from slide presentation of Dr. Lipman)
Plaintiff's exhibit 39, (certified copy of IDAPA rules)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 41 (discovery) Read to the jury will be a part of the record, will NOT go to
jury

EXHIBITS NOT SENT TO SUPREME COURT
Defendant's
Defendant's
Defendant's
Defendant's

Exhibit 227 (OxyContin bottle and pills)
Exhibit 227 A (OxyContin bottle)
Exhibit 227B (Amitriptyline bottle and pills)
Exhibit 227C (Furosemide bottle)

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 4

Defendant's Exhibit 227D (Amitriptyline bottle and pills)
Defendant's Exhibit 227E (Hydrocodone bottle and pills)
Defendant's Exhibit 227F (Enalapril maleate bottle and pills)
Defendant's Exhibit 227G (Bextra bottle and pills)
Defendant's Exhibit 227H (Norvasc bottle)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12 (Methadone bottle and pills)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 32 (Hydrocodone bottle and pills)

In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 13'h day of June, 2008.
KRISTINA GLASCOCK
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 5

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually and as
surviving spouse and Personal Representative
of the Estate of Rosie Schmechel, deceased
and ROBERT P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD
and TAMARA HALL, natural children of
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased,

)
')
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs/ Appellants,
)
)
vs
)
)
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
)
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
)
Corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A.,
)
and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X, )
)
Defendants/Respondents.
)

CASE NO. CV 05-4345

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD and
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
David Comstock
Byron Foster
199 N Capitol Blvd., Ste 500
P. 0. Box 2774
Boise, ID 83701-2774

Steven Hippler
J. Will Varin
601 W, Bannock Street
P. 0. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

Certificate of Service

1

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said this 10'"
day of July, 2008.

KRISTINA GLASCOCK
C . of the District Court

Certificate of Service

2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually and as
surviving spouse and Personal Representative
of the Estate of Rosie Schmechel, deceased
and ROBERT P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD
and TAMARA HALL, natural children of
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased,
Plaintiffs/ Appellants,

n

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

CASE NO. CV 05-4345

AMENDED
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

)
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
)
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
)
Corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A.,
)
and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X, )
)
Defendants/Respondents.
)

I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify:
That the following is a list of exhibits to the record that have been filed during the
course of this case.

Amended Affidavit of Counsel, Dated Received December 18, 2007, THIS
DOCUMENT DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN FILED WITH THE DISTRICT
COURT
Court's Exhibit 1 (Judgment upon special verdict CV 04-3002)
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's

Exhibit 1 (9/26/03 -9/30/03 handwritten office note - Bryne)
Exhibit 2 (9/26/03 typed office note - Bryne)
Exhibit 4 (9/29/03 typed office note - Bryne)
Exhibit 6 (9/30/03 typed office note- Bryne)
Exhibit 7 (medication log from clinic)

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 1

Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 EXCLUDING pages 15 through 20 (Southern Idaho Pain Institute medical
records)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 9 (Southern Idaho Pain Institute appointment record)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 (handwritten note re medications by Thomas Bryne, PA)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 (photograph of pill container methadone)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 (graphic record of pill counts)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 17 (Twin Falls County Coroner's Autopsy Report)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 19-1 (photo of Ms. Schmechel)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 19-2 (photo of Mr. and Ms. Schmechel)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 19-3 (photo of Kaylee and Ms. Schmechel)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 19-4 (photo of Ms. Schmechel and Kim's twins Kaylee and Kris)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 20-1 (Valentines Day card to Rosalie from Vaughn)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 20-2 (Napa Valley post card to Rosalie from Vaughn)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 20-3 Anniversary card from Rosalie to Vaughn)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 20-4 (birthday card from Tammy to Mom)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 20-5 (card to Rosalie from Kim)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 22 (certificate of death -Rosalie Schmechel)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 23 (prescription script 9/26/03 methadone ex 4 to Jensen depo)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 25 (information leaflet from pharmacy)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 40 (delegation of services agreement)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 45 page 5 (Dr. Binegar web page printout)
Defendant's Exhibit 14A (pill count)
Defendant's Exhibit 200B (9/18/03 completed pain questionnaire Southern Idaho Pain
Institute)
Defendant's Exhibit 200J (9/29/03 office note Southern Idaho Pain Institute
Defendant's Exhibit 200K (9/30/03 office note Southern Idaho Pain Institute)
Defendant's Exhibit 202 pages 1 through 72 (Physician's Center's medical records for Ms.
Schemechel)
Defendant's Exhibit 2021 (Diagnostic Imaging report)
Defendant's Exhibit 202J (2/ 16/88 lab report)
Defendant's Exhibit 202K (4/20/95 lab report)
'------V··,efendant's··Exhibit-202L-(iD/08/97··labreport·r---------------------Defendant's Exhibit 202M (5/1/01 lab report)
Defendant's Exhibit 202N (12/16/02 lab report)
Defendant's Exhibit 203 pages 48, 87, 88, 90 and 91 only (Sun Valley Pain Management
medical records for Rosalie Schmechel)
Defendant's Exhibit 203A (9/16/03 Chart note Dr. Kimberly Vorse)
Defendant's Exhibit 205 pages 1, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 (10/02/03 TFCO Sheriff's
report)

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 2

Defendant's Exhibit 206 (TFCO Sheriff's photographs page 3 c-pap machine)
Defendant's Exhibit 207 pages 7 through 17 (10/03/03 TFCO Coroner's Report)
Defendant's Exhibit 208 (TFCO Coroner's Photo)
Defendant's Exhibit 211 (Pharmacy records, The Medicine Shoppe, computer printout)
Defendant's Exhibit 217 (The Medicine Shoppe, prescription script and computer generated
label Hydrocodone 9/26/03)
Defendant's Exhibit 218 (computer generated copy of prescription) SAME AS PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT 23
Defendant's Exhibit 219 (patient information leaflet from the Medicine Shoppe)
Defendant's Exhibit 220 (patient information leaflet) SAME AS PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 25
Defendant's Exhibit 221 (oxycontin label 9/18/03 photograph)
Defendant's Exhibit 223 (methadone label 9/26/03)
Defendant's Exhibit 223A (methadone pills - photograph)
Defendant's Exhibit 233 (11/14/01 employment contract/job description of Thomas J. Bryne
w/Southern Idaho Pain Institute
Defendant's Exhibit 239 (Southern Idaho Pain Institute's land line phone records and home
phone land line records of Dille)
Defendant's Exhibit 240 (cell phone records of Dille)
Defendant's Exhibit 241 (Cell phone records of Bryne)
Defendant's exhibit 242, (personal phone records of Mr. Bryne)
Defendant's Exhibit 143 (phone records land line of Vaughn Schmechel)
Defendant's Exhibit 244 (phone records cell phone of Vaughn Schmechel)
Defendant's Exhibit 245 (Robert Lewis cell phone records)
Defendant's Exhibit 246 (phone records of Tammy Hall)
Defendant's Exhibit 247 (cell phone records of Kim Howard)
Defendant's Exhibit 248 page 4 (2006 tax records)
Defendant's Exhibit 249 page 4 (2005 tax records)
Defendant's Exhibit 250 Page 4 (2004 tax record)
Defendant's Exhibit 251 Page 4 (2003 tax record)
Defendant's Exhibit 277 (notes of Robert Lewis)

EXHIBITS NOT ADMITTED
Plaintiff's Exhibit 33 pages 11 and 12 (graphs from slide presentation of Dr. Lipman)
Plaintiff's exhibit 39, (certified copy of IDAPA rules)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 41 (discovery) Read to the jury will be a part of the record, will NOT go to
jury
Plaintiff's Exhibit 29 (obituary of Rosalie Schmechel)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 30 (pamphlet from funeral)

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 3

EXHIBITS NOT SENT TO SUPREME COURT
Defendant's Exhibit 227 (OxyContin bottle and pills)
Defendant's Exhibit 227A (OxyContin bottle)
Defendant's Exhibit 227B (Amitriptyline bottle and pills)
Defendant's Exhibit 227C (Furosemide bottle)
Defendant's Exhibit 227D (Amitriptyline bottle and pills)
Defendant's Exhibit 227E (Hydrocodone bottle and pills)
Defendant's Exhibit 227F (Enalapril maleate bottle and pills)
Defendant's Exhibit 227G (Bextra bottle and pills)
Defendant's Exhibit 227H (Norvasc bottle)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12 (Methadone bottle and pills)
Plaintiff's Exhibit 32 (Hydrocodone bottle and pills)

In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 10" day of September, 2008.

KRISTINA GLASCOCK
Clerk of the District Court

~~
-------·---·-'-·-----'---··

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 4

----------------------

